Some have an almost religious faith that Israel will one day cease to exist. Others maintain that Israel will end if the Arabs optimise their conviction that it is an alien entity in the region, incapable of reaching a just peace because it seeks to dominate rather than to assimilate. Odder yet is the belief that peace is the key to Israel's inevitable destruction. Unless Israel can be delivered a major defeat just once, proponents of this belief hold, normalisation is the most powerful weapon against it, because it would then be torn apart by its internal contradictions.
There is no proof of the potential efficacy of either the major defeat concept or the normalisation weapon, even if Ben-Gurion had raised the spectre of the latter.
Unfortunately, the reiteration of such unsubstantiated claims becomes a form of opiate for the people, a mystical alternative to the summoning of collective will, the formulation of a strategy for resistance, and the proactive exploitation of Israel's internal contradictions.
Plurality within the framework of Zionist unity has never been a sign of a weakness that, if left to its own dynamics, would lead to Israel's collapse.
To the contrary, it is a sign of strength. It is indicative of the ability of that plurality to organise itself, in accordance with the rules of a democratic process and on the basis of certain principles of a national consensus.
Moreover, to add insult to injury, those people who appeared in this region from all corners of the earth did not come from a single nationality or even, necessarily, from a democratic culture in the countries they hailed from.
Yet they succeeded in creating a national bond, or call it what you will, that could serve as a basis for the rules of a communal democratic game for Jews without their polity breaking down along tribal, sectarian or cultural divides.
Meanwhile, 60 years after the Nakba, the Arab peoples, who speak a single language and who had formulated an Arab national project long before the birth of colonialist Zionism, are still reluctant to respect the rules of a democratic game for fear that that will lead to dissolution into hostile parties, tribes and sects.
The memory of the Nakba will not help create democratic institutionalised systems of government in the Arab world or realise Arab unity. Such tasks require the unification of diverse interests or the domination of an overriding interest, and the creation of identity-shaping institutions, value systems and books, all of which reproduce it in shape and form.
Nor are they part of confronting the Nakba. Rather they are a part of confronting dictatorship, the absence of the rule of law, the personification of political life, oppression and corruption with an alternative political project founded upon national agendas and capable of transcending protest to offer realistic options.
None of this will happen until it becomes an aim in its own right. However, the memory of the Nakba is important. Indeed, it is as vital to this nation as air and water. There can be no national identity without collective national memory. I stress the memory of the Nakba . If the actual Nakba had not occurred, the Arabs may have been better off and they may have even realised a form of unification like other peoples. However, the Nakba, like the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the June 1967 war, is also a stage in the formation of collective Arab memory, as distinct from other national collective memories, and it remains the most significant stage in the formation of modern Palestinian identity with all its positive and negative traits.
The memory of the Nakba has a political dimension that is rarely discussed, especially now that the current "peace process" has transformed the Palestinian cause into the cause of the territories occupied in 1967, even though that political dimension should be the most important facet of the process. Even under the logic of the negotiating process and its stylised rhetoric that is divorced from reality and captive to wishful thinking, a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, even a fully sovereign one, can not be regarded as a compromise solution unless it is recognised that the Palestinian tragedy began not in 1967 but in 1948. Even a bi-national state is a compromise solution from this perspective since it recognises a priori that the country was Arab in its entirety before being subjected to a protracted armed robbery in full view of the 20th century.
To date the "problem" to the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 is to refute the Palestinian cause. To acknowledge the Nakba is to acknowledge the historic injustice inflicted upon the Palestinian people in 1948, which, in turn, is a prerequisite to the search for relatively just redress for this people. Justice (relative to the catastrophe that befell the Palestinian people in 1948) is not a negotiable principle. If negotiations were based on this principle it would be merely a matter for negotiations to work out how to translate it on the ground. In the absence of a common principle, on the other hand, negotiations must inevitably fall prey to the balances of power, which as they stand would impose an Israeli solution. This is how Israel perceives the negotiating process and has always perceived it and this is why Israel will only accept a negotiating partner that accepts an Israeli solution. The memory of the Nakba is vital because its most salient consequence is the refugee question, which is still alive and waiting for a solution today.
Certain parties here and there are keen to drop this matter from the international, Arab and national agenda, even though it started out as an international question with respect to which the Palestinians obtained international resolutions in their favour even before the international community recognised them as a people with the right to self- determination (if the partition resolution effectively recognised this right it is also the resolution that effectively justified the theft of half of Palestinian land).Palestinian refugeedom is not a state of mind to be indulged when the spirit takes one, as some poets and novelists seem to imagine.
It is a permanent state characterised by the loss of home, citizenship, fundamental rights and hope. It is a state of obliviousness and oblivion for some Palestinian elites who have abandoned hope of victory and given themselves over to solving their own problems through politics.
In the meantime, the Palestinian refugee camp, especially in Lebanon, has become a place of accumulating misery and wretchedness in the absence of any attainable hope for return, which had justified the permanence of the camp, and in the absence of the option of resistance from the outside, which had once transformed the camp into a school of national liberation struggle. What is the sinificance of the Palestinian refugee camp in an Arab country without the option of resistance from the outside and without the hope for return in the near future?The Palestinian national liberation struggle began as a refugee movement, waging armed struggle from the outside.
The camp was the centre of that movement. Were it not for armed struggle it would not have been possible to sustain it. The camp was by definition a temporary condition until the realisation of the right of return -- a base, school and community for the resistance. Once these reasons for its existence ceased it became nothing but a ghetto of poverty and misery.
These are the conditions that produce Shaker Al-Abbasi and others, and that produce crime and political apathy.
They might also engender local community gentrification drives, as occurred in the Yarmouk camp, or they might simply drive people out, as occurred in many camps in Lebanon. If the refugee camp is to be salvaged from its wretchedness and preserved for the purpose for which it was meant to serve there must be a national project for resistance for which the camp serves as a centre. Has any thought been given to this of late? I suspect not. Certainly indifference to the fate of the inhabitants of Al-Barid River and of the refugees of Iraq, and the neglect of their fate on the part of the current official Palestinian leadership in particular, form a painful episode that compels us to contemplate such questions.
In some Arab countries, the memory of the Nakba was used to justify the inhumane treatment of Palestinian refugees. That way they would remember they were refugees, or so the official thinking went. Sadly, such treatment was not so much a reminder of the Nakba as an extension of it. Indeed, it was part and parcel of the Nakba. The Palestinians have not appealed for citizenship in this Arab country or that. More importantly, they were hardly in need of additional persecution and maltreatment to remind them of their original towns and villages and the homes they were forced to flee, the keys to which are still passed from generation to generation as they fluctuate between hope and despair.Meanwhile, the shift of the centre of gravity of the Palestinian national movement from the outside to the inside
-- and from the 1948 to the 1967 reference point
-- failed to produce a unified Palestinian strategy for resistance. In fact, it appears to have led to a vertical rift, the most dangerous aspect of which is not plurality within the framework of a liberation movement but fundamental division over the very strategy of the movement. No liberation movement can sustain this, which is a division over both aims and means, and not just a power struggle, as ugly as that is already.Undoubtedly, the neutralisation of the roots
-- the Nakba and the cause of seeking refuge
-- and the neutralisation of the role of the refugees themselves as communities were instrumental in creating that polarisation inside a non-sovereign Palestinian Authority governing entity. On anniversary of the Nakba we must not only recall the rights of Palestinian refugees. We must also remember to ask ourselves what role the Palestinian Diaspora and refugees should play in the framework current Palestinian policy
Showing posts with label essays. Show all posts
Showing posts with label essays. Show all posts
Thursday, June 19, 2008
Refugees are the essence
Some have an almost religious faith that Israel will one day cease to exist. Others maintain that Israel will end if the Arabs optimise their conviction that it is an alien entity in the region, incapable of reaching a just peace because it seeks to dominate rather than to assimilate. Odder yet is the belief that peace is the key to Israel's inevitable destruction. Unless Israel can be delivered a major defeat just once, proponents of this belief hold, normalisation is the most powerful weapon against it, because it would then be torn apart by its internal contradictions.
There is no proof of the potential efficacy of either the major defeat concept or the normalisation weapon, even if Ben-Gurion had raised the spectre of the latter.
Unfortunately, the reiteration of such unsubstantiated claims becomes a form of opiate for the people, a mystical alternative to the summoning of collective will, the formulation of a strategy for resistance, and the proactive exploitation of Israel's internal contradictions.
Plurality within the framework of Zionist unity has never been a sign of a weakness that, if left to its own dynamics, would lead to Israel's collapse.
To the contrary, it is a sign of strength. It is indicative of the ability of that plurality to organise itself, in accordance with the rules of a democratic process and on the basis of certain principles of a national consensus.
Moreover, to add insult to injury, those people who appeared in this region from all corners of the earth did not come from a single nationality or even, necessarily, from a democratic culture in the countries they hailed from.
Yet they succeeded in creating a national bond, or call it what you will, that could serve as a basis for the rules of a communal democratic game for Jews without their polity breaking down along tribal, sectarian or cultural divides.
Meanwhile, 60 years after the Nakba, the Arab peoples, who speak a single language and who had formulated an Arab national project long before the birth of colonialist Zionism, are still reluctant to respect the rules of a democratic game for fear that that will lead to dissolution into hostile parties, tribes and sects.
The memory of the Nakba will not help create democratic institutionalised systems of government in the Arab world or realise Arab unity. Such tasks require the unification of diverse interests or the domination of an overriding interest, and the creation of identity-shaping institutions, value systems and books, all of which reproduce it in shape and form.
Nor are they part of confronting the Nakba. Rather they are a part of confronting dictatorship, the absence of the rule of law, the personification of political life, oppression and corruption with an alternative political project founded upon national agendas and capable of transcending protest to offer realistic options.
None of this will happen until it becomes an aim in its own right. However, the memory of the Nakba is important. Indeed, it is as vital to this nation as air and water. There can be no national identity without collective national memory. I stress the memory of the Nakba . If the actual Nakba had not occurred, the Arabs may have been better off and they may have even realised a form of unification like other peoples. However, the Nakba, like the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the June 1967 war, is also a stage in the formation of collective Arab memory, as distinct from other national collective memories, and it remains the most significant stage in the formation of modern Palestinian identity with all its positive and negative traits.
The memory of the Nakba has a political dimension that is rarely discussed, especially now that the current "peace process" has transformed the Palestinian cause into the cause of the territories occupied in 1967, even though that political dimension should be the most important facet of the process. Even under the logic of the negotiating process and its stylised rhetoric that is divorced from reality and captive to wishful thinking, a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, even a fully sovereign one, can not be regarded as a compromise solution unless it is recognised that the Palestinian tragedy began not in 1967 but in 1948. Even a bi-national state is a compromise solution from this perspective since it recognises a priori that the country was Arab in its entirety before being subjected to a protracted armed robbery in full view of the 20th century.
To date the "problem" to the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 is to refute the Palestinian cause. To acknowledge the Nakba is to acknowledge the historic injustice inflicted upon the Palestinian people in 1948, which, in turn, is a prerequisite to the search for relatively just redress for this people. Justice (relative to the catastrophe that befell the Palestinian people in 1948) is not a negotiable principle. If negotiations were based on this principle it would be merely a matter for negotiations to work out how to translate it on the ground. In the absence of a common principle, on the other hand, negotiations must inevitably fall prey to the balances of power, which as they stand would impose an Israeli solution. This is how Israel perceives the negotiating process and has always perceived it and this is why Israel will only accept a negotiating partner that accepts an Israeli solution. The memory of the Nakba is vital because its most salient consequence is the refugee question, which is still alive and waiting for a solution today.
Certain parties here and there are keen to drop this matter from the international, Arab and national agenda, even though it started out as an international question with respect to which the Palestinians obtained international resolutions in their favour even before the international community recognised them as a people with the right to self- determination (if the partition resolution effectively recognised this right it is also the resolution that effectively justified the theft of half of Palestinian land).Palestinian refugeedom is not a state of mind to be indulged when the spirit takes one, as some poets and novelists seem to imagine.
It is a permanent state characterised by the loss of home, citizenship, fundamental rights and hope. It is a state of obliviousness and oblivion for some Palestinian elites who have abandoned hope of victory and given themselves over to solving their own problems through politics.
In the meantime, the Palestinian refugee camp, especially in Lebanon, has become a place of accumulating misery and wretchedness in the absence of any attainable hope for return, which had justified the permanence of the camp, and in the absence of the option of resistance from the outside, which had once transformed the camp into a school of national liberation struggle. What is the sinificance of the Palestinian refugee camp in an Arab country without the option of resistance from the outside and without the hope for return in the near future?The Palestinian national liberation struggle began as a refugee movement, waging armed struggle from the outside.
The camp was the centre of that movement. Were it not for armed struggle it would not have been possible to sustain it. The camp was by definition a temporary condition until the realisation of the right of return -- a base, school and community for the resistance. Once these reasons for its existence ceased it became nothing but a ghetto of poverty and misery.
These are the conditions that produce Shaker Al-Abbasi and others, and that produce crime and political apathy.
They might also engender local community gentrification drives, as occurred in the Yarmouk camp, or they might simply drive people out, as occurred in many camps in Lebanon. If the refugee camp is to be salvaged from its wretchedness and preserved for the purpose for which it was meant to serve there must be a national project for resistance for which the camp serves as a centre. Has any thought been given to this of late? I suspect not. Certainly indifference to the fate of the inhabitants of Al-Barid River and of the refugees of Iraq, and the neglect of their fate on the part of the current official Palestinian leadership in particular, form a painful episode that compels us to contemplate such questions.
In some Arab countries, the memory of the Nakba was used to justify the inhumane treatment of Palestinian refugees. That way they would remember they were refugees, or so the official thinking went. Sadly, such treatment was not so much a reminder of the Nakba as an extension of it. Indeed, it was part and parcel of the Nakba. The Palestinians have not appealed for citizenship in this Arab country or that. More importantly, they were hardly in need of additional persecution and maltreatment to remind them of their original towns and villages and the homes they were forced to flee, the keys to which are still passed from generation to generation as they fluctuate between hope and despair.Meanwhile, the shift of the centre of gravity of the Palestinian national movement from the outside to the inside
-- and from the 1948 to the 1967 reference point
-- failed to produce a unified Palestinian strategy for resistance. In fact, it appears to have led to a vertical rift, the most dangerous aspect of which is not plurality within the framework of a liberation movement but fundamental division over the very strategy of the movement. No liberation movement can sustain this, which is a division over both aims and means, and not just a power struggle, as ugly as that is already.Undoubtedly, the neutralisation of the roots
-- the Nakba and the cause of seeking refuge
-- and the neutralisation of the role of the refugees themselves as communities were instrumental in creating that polarisation inside a non-sovereign Palestinian Authority governing entity. On anniversary of the Nakba we must not only recall the rights of Palestinian refugees. We must also remember to ask ourselves what role the Palestinian Diaspora and refugees should play in the framework current Palestinian policy
There is no proof of the potential efficacy of either the major defeat concept or the normalisation weapon, even if Ben-Gurion had raised the spectre of the latter.
Unfortunately, the reiteration of such unsubstantiated claims becomes a form of opiate for the people, a mystical alternative to the summoning of collective will, the formulation of a strategy for resistance, and the proactive exploitation of Israel's internal contradictions.
Plurality within the framework of Zionist unity has never been a sign of a weakness that, if left to its own dynamics, would lead to Israel's collapse.
To the contrary, it is a sign of strength. It is indicative of the ability of that plurality to organise itself, in accordance with the rules of a democratic process and on the basis of certain principles of a national consensus.
Moreover, to add insult to injury, those people who appeared in this region from all corners of the earth did not come from a single nationality or even, necessarily, from a democratic culture in the countries they hailed from.
Yet they succeeded in creating a national bond, or call it what you will, that could serve as a basis for the rules of a communal democratic game for Jews without their polity breaking down along tribal, sectarian or cultural divides.
Meanwhile, 60 years after the Nakba, the Arab peoples, who speak a single language and who had formulated an Arab national project long before the birth of colonialist Zionism, are still reluctant to respect the rules of a democratic game for fear that that will lead to dissolution into hostile parties, tribes and sects.
The memory of the Nakba will not help create democratic institutionalised systems of government in the Arab world or realise Arab unity. Such tasks require the unification of diverse interests or the domination of an overriding interest, and the creation of identity-shaping institutions, value systems and books, all of which reproduce it in shape and form.
Nor are they part of confronting the Nakba. Rather they are a part of confronting dictatorship, the absence of the rule of law, the personification of political life, oppression and corruption with an alternative political project founded upon national agendas and capable of transcending protest to offer realistic options.
None of this will happen until it becomes an aim in its own right. However, the memory of the Nakba is important. Indeed, it is as vital to this nation as air and water. There can be no national identity without collective national memory. I stress the memory of the Nakba . If the actual Nakba had not occurred, the Arabs may have been better off and they may have even realised a form of unification like other peoples. However, the Nakba, like the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the June 1967 war, is also a stage in the formation of collective Arab memory, as distinct from other national collective memories, and it remains the most significant stage in the formation of modern Palestinian identity with all its positive and negative traits.
The memory of the Nakba has a political dimension that is rarely discussed, especially now that the current "peace process" has transformed the Palestinian cause into the cause of the territories occupied in 1967, even though that political dimension should be the most important facet of the process. Even under the logic of the negotiating process and its stylised rhetoric that is divorced from reality and captive to wishful thinking, a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, even a fully sovereign one, can not be regarded as a compromise solution unless it is recognised that the Palestinian tragedy began not in 1967 but in 1948. Even a bi-national state is a compromise solution from this perspective since it recognises a priori that the country was Arab in its entirety before being subjected to a protracted armed robbery in full view of the 20th century.
To date the "problem" to the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 is to refute the Palestinian cause. To acknowledge the Nakba is to acknowledge the historic injustice inflicted upon the Palestinian people in 1948, which, in turn, is a prerequisite to the search for relatively just redress for this people. Justice (relative to the catastrophe that befell the Palestinian people in 1948) is not a negotiable principle. If negotiations were based on this principle it would be merely a matter for negotiations to work out how to translate it on the ground. In the absence of a common principle, on the other hand, negotiations must inevitably fall prey to the balances of power, which as they stand would impose an Israeli solution. This is how Israel perceives the negotiating process and has always perceived it and this is why Israel will only accept a negotiating partner that accepts an Israeli solution. The memory of the Nakba is vital because its most salient consequence is the refugee question, which is still alive and waiting for a solution today.
Certain parties here and there are keen to drop this matter from the international, Arab and national agenda, even though it started out as an international question with respect to which the Palestinians obtained international resolutions in their favour even before the international community recognised them as a people with the right to self- determination (if the partition resolution effectively recognised this right it is also the resolution that effectively justified the theft of half of Palestinian land).Palestinian refugeedom is not a state of mind to be indulged when the spirit takes one, as some poets and novelists seem to imagine.
It is a permanent state characterised by the loss of home, citizenship, fundamental rights and hope. It is a state of obliviousness and oblivion for some Palestinian elites who have abandoned hope of victory and given themselves over to solving their own problems through politics.
In the meantime, the Palestinian refugee camp, especially in Lebanon, has become a place of accumulating misery and wretchedness in the absence of any attainable hope for return, which had justified the permanence of the camp, and in the absence of the option of resistance from the outside, which had once transformed the camp into a school of national liberation struggle. What is the sinificance of the Palestinian refugee camp in an Arab country without the option of resistance from the outside and without the hope for return in the near future?The Palestinian national liberation struggle began as a refugee movement, waging armed struggle from the outside.
The camp was the centre of that movement. Were it not for armed struggle it would not have been possible to sustain it. The camp was by definition a temporary condition until the realisation of the right of return -- a base, school and community for the resistance. Once these reasons for its existence ceased it became nothing but a ghetto of poverty and misery.
These are the conditions that produce Shaker Al-Abbasi and others, and that produce crime and political apathy.
They might also engender local community gentrification drives, as occurred in the Yarmouk camp, or they might simply drive people out, as occurred in many camps in Lebanon. If the refugee camp is to be salvaged from its wretchedness and preserved for the purpose for which it was meant to serve there must be a national project for resistance for which the camp serves as a centre. Has any thought been given to this of late? I suspect not. Certainly indifference to the fate of the inhabitants of Al-Barid River and of the refugees of Iraq, and the neglect of their fate on the part of the current official Palestinian leadership in particular, form a painful episode that compels us to contemplate such questions.
In some Arab countries, the memory of the Nakba was used to justify the inhumane treatment of Palestinian refugees. That way they would remember they were refugees, or so the official thinking went. Sadly, such treatment was not so much a reminder of the Nakba as an extension of it. Indeed, it was part and parcel of the Nakba. The Palestinians have not appealed for citizenship in this Arab country or that. More importantly, they were hardly in need of additional persecution and maltreatment to remind them of their original towns and villages and the homes they were forced to flee, the keys to which are still passed from generation to generation as they fluctuate between hope and despair.Meanwhile, the shift of the centre of gravity of the Palestinian national movement from the outside to the inside
-- and from the 1948 to the 1967 reference point
-- failed to produce a unified Palestinian strategy for resistance. In fact, it appears to have led to a vertical rift, the most dangerous aspect of which is not plurality within the framework of a liberation movement but fundamental division over the very strategy of the movement. No liberation movement can sustain this, which is a division over both aims and means, and not just a power struggle, as ugly as that is already.Undoubtedly, the neutralisation of the roots
-- the Nakba and the cause of seeking refuge
-- and the neutralisation of the role of the refugees themselves as communities were instrumental in creating that polarisation inside a non-sovereign Palestinian Authority governing entity. On anniversary of the Nakba we must not only recall the rights of Palestinian refugees. We must also remember to ask ourselves what role the Palestinian Diaspora and refugees should play in the framework current Palestinian policy
Monday, June 2, 2008
Peace between Syria and Israel is a prerequisite for peace in the Mideast
The sudden surge in talks about resuming Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations is suspect because there is little to indicate that Israel is willing to meet the minimum requirement for peace: withdrawal from Syria’s Golan Heights.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert appears to be finding a deviation from his political troubles at home with the renewed focus on Syria.The US is talking in favour of Syrian-Israeli negotiations, but that should be seen as Washington’s need to show progress in Israeli-Palestinian talks by somehow diluting Syrian reservations.
There is a conviction among many that the US is posturing without really meaning to encourage Syrian-Israeli talks.
Then there is the Lebanese angle. The crisis in Lebanon will never be solved as long as Syria and Israel do not make peace.
Even at that, there is no assurance that the Lebanese parties would be willing to make peace if Syria shifts its position after making peace with Israel.At the same time, there is a strong camp within the Israeli body politic in favour of peace with Syria.
That camp includes President Shimon Peres who has said that if Syrian President Bashar Assad is serious about reaching peace with Israel, he should either visit occupied Jerusalem or invite the Israeli prime minister to Damascus for talks.
Peres is citing the example of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat who visited occupied Jerusalem and addressed the Knesset.
Had Sadat not done so, there would not have been Israeli-Egyptian peace, Peres argues.
Notwithstanding all these, reports in the Europe-based Arabic press say that peace negotiations between Israel and Syria could resume as early as next week.
The reports quoted Syrian officials as saying that the goal of the negotiations was to find an encounter point for the two sides.
“When we say that the negotiations are serious, we mean that the other side is committing to a full withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 borders,” said an unidentified Syrian official.That is precisely the sticking point, since Israel is not willing to relinquish the Golan Heights it occupied in the 1967 war.
The border that Syria is talking about includes a small strip of land on the shores of Lake Tiberias that Israel occupied in 1948 in violation of the UN resolution that specified the borders of the Jewish state.
The Syrians say that in 1995, the Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin committed himself, to the American administration, to an Israeli withdrawal to the borders of June 4, 1967.
Israel has never agreed to this interpretation.Olmert has also denied that he had committed to withdrawing from the occupied Golan Heights as a precondition set by Syria for renewing peace negotiations.
The source of scepticism over prospects for genuine Israeli-Syrian negotiations is the reality that no Israeli government would be ready to give up the Golan Heights, which accounts for the bulk of Israel’s water sources. With the deep divide between the Syrian demand for June 4, 1967, borders and Israel’s refusal to give up the Golan, the scepticism is all the more powerful.
However, recent reports indicate that the two sides have made progress.According to the London-based Arabic-language newspaper Al Hayat, a recent round of talks between the two sides, under Turkish mediation, was aimed, among other things, at setting a timetable for Israel’s withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, borders.Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mouallem told the newspaper: “There will not be a situation in which Syria advances even one step (in the peace process) without a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights.
This is not a prerequisite; it is our right.
”According to a report in the Arabic daily Al Sharq Al Awsat, Syria has not yet been asked to break its alliance with Iran and Tehran had expressed understanding with the negotiations and that Iran itself was “holding talks with other sources”.
The paper also reported “significant progress” in the Syria-Israel diplomatic negotiations and that the two sides were on the verge of transition to direct talks, but that such discussions were dependent on regional and political conditions.
The report says that there had already been agreements concerning the main principles of security arrangements, water, borders and normalisation.
He said that Israel agreed that the security arrangements between the two sides would be implemented temporarily until trust is built between the two sides.Burying scepticism, one hopes that there is substance in these assertions. Peace between Syria and Israel is a prerequisite for peace in the Middle East.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert appears to be finding a deviation from his political troubles at home with the renewed focus on Syria.The US is talking in favour of Syrian-Israeli negotiations, but that should be seen as Washington’s need to show progress in Israeli-Palestinian talks by somehow diluting Syrian reservations.
There is a conviction among many that the US is posturing without really meaning to encourage Syrian-Israeli talks.
Then there is the Lebanese angle. The crisis in Lebanon will never be solved as long as Syria and Israel do not make peace.
Even at that, there is no assurance that the Lebanese parties would be willing to make peace if Syria shifts its position after making peace with Israel.At the same time, there is a strong camp within the Israeli body politic in favour of peace with Syria.
That camp includes President Shimon Peres who has said that if Syrian President Bashar Assad is serious about reaching peace with Israel, he should either visit occupied Jerusalem or invite the Israeli prime minister to Damascus for talks.
Peres is citing the example of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat who visited occupied Jerusalem and addressed the Knesset.
Had Sadat not done so, there would not have been Israeli-Egyptian peace, Peres argues.
Notwithstanding all these, reports in the Europe-based Arabic press say that peace negotiations between Israel and Syria could resume as early as next week.
The reports quoted Syrian officials as saying that the goal of the negotiations was to find an encounter point for the two sides.
“When we say that the negotiations are serious, we mean that the other side is committing to a full withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 borders,” said an unidentified Syrian official.That is precisely the sticking point, since Israel is not willing to relinquish the Golan Heights it occupied in the 1967 war.
The border that Syria is talking about includes a small strip of land on the shores of Lake Tiberias that Israel occupied in 1948 in violation of the UN resolution that specified the borders of the Jewish state.
The Syrians say that in 1995, the Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin committed himself, to the American administration, to an Israeli withdrawal to the borders of June 4, 1967.
Israel has never agreed to this interpretation.Olmert has also denied that he had committed to withdrawing from the occupied Golan Heights as a precondition set by Syria for renewing peace negotiations.
The source of scepticism over prospects for genuine Israeli-Syrian negotiations is the reality that no Israeli government would be ready to give up the Golan Heights, which accounts for the bulk of Israel’s water sources. With the deep divide between the Syrian demand for June 4, 1967, borders and Israel’s refusal to give up the Golan, the scepticism is all the more powerful.
However, recent reports indicate that the two sides have made progress.According to the London-based Arabic-language newspaper Al Hayat, a recent round of talks between the two sides, under Turkish mediation, was aimed, among other things, at setting a timetable for Israel’s withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, borders.Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mouallem told the newspaper: “There will not be a situation in which Syria advances even one step (in the peace process) without a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights.
This is not a prerequisite; it is our right.
”According to a report in the Arabic daily Al Sharq Al Awsat, Syria has not yet been asked to break its alliance with Iran and Tehran had expressed understanding with the negotiations and that Iran itself was “holding talks with other sources”.
The paper also reported “significant progress” in the Syria-Israel diplomatic negotiations and that the two sides were on the verge of transition to direct talks, but that such discussions were dependent on regional and political conditions.
The report says that there had already been agreements concerning the main principles of security arrangements, water, borders and normalisation.
He said that Israel agreed that the security arrangements between the two sides would be implemented temporarily until trust is built between the two sides.Burying scepticism, one hopes that there is substance in these assertions. Peace between Syria and Israel is a prerequisite for peace in the Middle East.
Sunday, May 25, 2008
Freedom Is More Important
I have contributed to the advance of the telecommunications technology though I "lag behind" in terms of personal information and practice.
In the late 90s, and under my guidance as editor-in-chief, Al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper became the first daily in the world to publish its pages on trans-continental satellites - at a time when The Wall Street Journal was still publishing its pages inside the United States.
In the late 80s too, Al-Hayat became at my helm the first pan-Arab daily in large size paper to be printed electronically, along with two dailies in the Gulf. In fact, the font used by Al-Hayat was common to the majority of the Arab newspapers that turned to electronic printing.
In both dailies, the credit in technological pioneering goes mostly to my colleagues, and not to me.
Technology is very important.
But freedom is more important, or in other words, constitutes the most important media element. It is exercised in the West in such an enviable manner. Yet, the Western press with deep-rooted traditions have not been fair to the Arabs and Muslims. In my opinion, the least of their "sins" is neglecting Arab and Muslim causes, as has been the case during the preparations for the war on Iraq. The failure of leading American dailies was so remarkable that I sometimes felt it was deliberate.
But I hope I am wrong.
These days, the Western media exploit the freedom they enjoy to serve other goals. An example is Khaled Bin Mahfouz, a co-founder of the Saudi National Commercial Bank. In British courts, he won the lawsuit against American writer Rachel Ehrenfeld who accused him of financing terror in her book Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed - and How to Stop It.
Printed in America, the book is sold in England on the internet.
On August 25, 2007, I raised this issue and had to argue for months with many dissenters, including Samuel Ibadi, a Jewish competent constitutional lawyer of Arab origin. In brief, Ehrenfeld's supporters described the British laws as old and outdated, ascertaining that the First Amendment to the US Constitution protects the freedom of speech.
A New York court rejected Ehrenfeld's lawsuit to overturn the British verdict for lack of jurisdiction, or in other words on the grounds that the US court is not allowed to rule on the matter.
Freedom of speech is unarguable and may be the most important, even the basic freedom used to defend other freedoms.
But the freedom of humiliation, like in the caricatures on the Prophet Mohammad, can not be covered with the first, second, or any other amendment. Accused of financing terrorism, Khaled Bin Mahfouz would have been imprisoned and his assets confiscated.
The British law resembles many other positive and divine laws. According to Islamic jurisprudence, the accused has to take the oath and the plaintiff has to provide evidence.
Which is easier? That the author brings evidence on Bin Mahfouz's donation of money to terrorists, or that Bin Mahfouz brings all terrorists to testify that they did not receive money from him?This takes us back to the issue of news and ideas, or the piece of information and opinion.
The piece of information has to be truthful, but opinion is sacred and a right enjoyed by the speaker.
Lawyers' fees and fines are sufficient punishment, and imprisonment is unjustified. I condemn every Arab country that imprisons journalists.
When I joined the world of journalism, I intended to buy a Volkswagen unlike other colleagues of mine who wanted to promote their ideas as members of political parties, organizations, or factions.
On the one hand, I believe I am a better journalist because I am neutral and can be objective. On the other hand, they are familiar with party details more than I am, and they have inside information that I lack.
At the end, I will go back to the first idea I raised when I started the discussion, i.e. the growing influence of the media despite the decline in the printed press in democratic countries.
To wrap up this discussion, I will mention another example. On June 12, 2007, Tony Blair delivered a speech to the Reuters news agency.
This speech was widely referred to as "feral beasts," as he likened journalists to feral beasts that hunt in a pack, just tearing people and reputations to bits. Consequently, when formulating a policy or following up a matter, his government thinks of journalists and their reactions more than of the task it needs to carry out.The Arab press is tamed just like docile sheep.
*Published in the London-based AL HAYAT on May 22, 2008. Jihad can be reached at http://www.j-khazen.blogspot.com
In the late 90s, and under my guidance as editor-in-chief, Al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper became the first daily in the world to publish its pages on trans-continental satellites - at a time when The Wall Street Journal was still publishing its pages inside the United States.
In the late 80s too, Al-Hayat became at my helm the first pan-Arab daily in large size paper to be printed electronically, along with two dailies in the Gulf. In fact, the font used by Al-Hayat was common to the majority of the Arab newspapers that turned to electronic printing.
In both dailies, the credit in technological pioneering goes mostly to my colleagues, and not to me.
Technology is very important.
But freedom is more important, or in other words, constitutes the most important media element. It is exercised in the West in such an enviable manner. Yet, the Western press with deep-rooted traditions have not been fair to the Arabs and Muslims. In my opinion, the least of their "sins" is neglecting Arab and Muslim causes, as has been the case during the preparations for the war on Iraq. The failure of leading American dailies was so remarkable that I sometimes felt it was deliberate.
But I hope I am wrong.
These days, the Western media exploit the freedom they enjoy to serve other goals. An example is Khaled Bin Mahfouz, a co-founder of the Saudi National Commercial Bank. In British courts, he won the lawsuit against American writer Rachel Ehrenfeld who accused him of financing terror in her book Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed - and How to Stop It.
Printed in America, the book is sold in England on the internet.
On August 25, 2007, I raised this issue and had to argue for months with many dissenters, including Samuel Ibadi, a Jewish competent constitutional lawyer of Arab origin. In brief, Ehrenfeld's supporters described the British laws as old and outdated, ascertaining that the First Amendment to the US Constitution protects the freedom of speech.
A New York court rejected Ehrenfeld's lawsuit to overturn the British verdict for lack of jurisdiction, or in other words on the grounds that the US court is not allowed to rule on the matter.
Freedom of speech is unarguable and may be the most important, even the basic freedom used to defend other freedoms.
But the freedom of humiliation, like in the caricatures on the Prophet Mohammad, can not be covered with the first, second, or any other amendment. Accused of financing terrorism, Khaled Bin Mahfouz would have been imprisoned and his assets confiscated.
The British law resembles many other positive and divine laws. According to Islamic jurisprudence, the accused has to take the oath and the plaintiff has to provide evidence.
Which is easier? That the author brings evidence on Bin Mahfouz's donation of money to terrorists, or that Bin Mahfouz brings all terrorists to testify that they did not receive money from him?This takes us back to the issue of news and ideas, or the piece of information and opinion.
The piece of information has to be truthful, but opinion is sacred and a right enjoyed by the speaker.
Lawyers' fees and fines are sufficient punishment, and imprisonment is unjustified. I condemn every Arab country that imprisons journalists.
When I joined the world of journalism, I intended to buy a Volkswagen unlike other colleagues of mine who wanted to promote their ideas as members of political parties, organizations, or factions.
On the one hand, I believe I am a better journalist because I am neutral and can be objective. On the other hand, they are familiar with party details more than I am, and they have inside information that I lack.
At the end, I will go back to the first idea I raised when I started the discussion, i.e. the growing influence of the media despite the decline in the printed press in democratic countries.
To wrap up this discussion, I will mention another example. On June 12, 2007, Tony Blair delivered a speech to the Reuters news agency.
This speech was widely referred to as "feral beasts," as he likened journalists to feral beasts that hunt in a pack, just tearing people and reputations to bits. Consequently, when formulating a policy or following up a matter, his government thinks of journalists and their reactions more than of the task it needs to carry out.The Arab press is tamed just like docile sheep.
*Published in the London-based AL HAYAT on May 22, 2008. Jihad can be reached at http://www.j-khazen.blogspot.com
Tuesday, May 13, 2008
Four days that changed the Middle East
Rami G. Khouri
Events in Beirut and other parts of Lebanon continue to move erratically, with simultaneous gestures of political compromise and armed clashes that have left 46 dead in the past week. The consequences of what has happened in the past week may portend an extraordinary but constructive new development: the possible emergence of the first American-Iranian joint political governance system in the Arab world. Maybe. If Lebanon shifts from street clashes to the hoped-for political compromise through a renewed national dialogue process, it will have a national unity government whose two factions receive arms, training, funds and political support from both the United States and Iran. Should this happen, an unspoken American-Iranian political condominium in Lebanon could prove to be key to power-sharing and stability in other parts of the region, such as Palestine, Iraq and other hot spots. This would also mark a huge defeat for the United States and its failed diplomatic approach that seeks to confront, battle and crush the Islamist-nationalists throughout the region.
The brief, isolated, but intense clashes that occurred in the four days between Wednesday and Sunday threatened a total, Iraq-like collapse of Lebanon, with the Hizbullah-led alliance controlling power in the capital Beirut and other critical areas. The frantic pace of political and street action comprised and clarified four noteworthy developments, whose implications for the rest of the Middle East could be momentous: 1. When the government decided to challenge Hizbullah on Tuesday by announcing it was sacking the Shiite army general in charge of airport security and dismantling Hizbullah's underground security telecommunications network, Hizbullah saw this as the first serious attempt by the government to try and disarm it. Hizbullah immediately challenged the government, warned it against these decisions, and made a show of force to protect its security and telecommunications system. When street clashes started in several parts of Beirut, the Iranian- and Syrian-backed Hizbullah-led opposition alliance quickly and roundly asserted its dominance over the US- and Saudi-backed government alliance. Put to the test, the new balance of power in Lebanon affirmed itself on the street for the first time in less than 24 hours.2. All the Lebanese parties repeatedly indicated a preference for political compromise over communal war, but also showed they were prepared to fight if forced to. The persistent negotiations via the mass media included critical agreements on naming the armed forces commander, General Michel Suleiman, as the new president, resuming the national dialogue, forming a government of national unity, and revising the electoral law before holding parliamentary elections next year. Negotiating offers came in sequence from Hizbullah secretary general and Shiite leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Future Movement head and Sunni leader Saad Hariri, Sunni Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, and the Shiite Amal movement of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, a Hizbullah ally.3. The newly vulnerable government effectively backed down Saturday and reversed its two decisions, as Hizbullah had demanded. The street balance of power was translated into a new political equation inside Lebanon. Hizbullah and its allies had achieved on the street that which they had been asking for politically: the capacity to veto government decisions that were seen as threatening Hizbullah's security and resistance activities. 4. By immediately handing over to the armed forces those few buildings and strategic locations that they had taken over in Beirut, Hizbullah and its allies sent the signal that they did not want to rule the entire country, and that they trusted the army as a neutral arbiter between the warring Lebanese factions. Prime Minister Siniora sent the same message when he asked the armed forces and their commander, Suleiman, to decide on the fate of the two contested government security decisions that had sparked Hizbullah's move into West Beirut. The armed forces emerged as the powerful political arbiter and peace-keeper, effectively forming a fourth branch of government, and the only one that is credible and effective in the eyes of the entire population. All factions have agreed to get their gunmen off the streets and leave only the army and police as public security guardians. Now they are expected to follow up quickly by formally naming Suleiman as president (to which they have all agreed already), agreeing on a transitional national unity government of technocrats, and drawing up a new election law. The precise sequence of those events is one of the disputed points that must be agreed, but agreement may be easier now that the army has emerged as a pivotal arbiter and political actor.The new domestic political balance of power in Lebanon will reflect millennia-old indigenous Middle Eastern traditions of different and often quarreling parties that live together peacefully after negotiating power relationships, rather than one party totally defeating and humiliating the other. Lebanon can only exist as a single country if its multi-ethnic and multi-religious population shares power. As the political leaders now seek to do this, they operate in a new context where the strongest group comprises Iranian- and Syrian-backed Islamist Shiites and their junior partners, Christian and Sunni Lebanese allies. They will share power in a national unity government with fellow Lebanese who are friends, allies, dependents and proxies of the United States and Saudi Arabia. If a new Middle East truly is being born, this may well prove to be its nursery.
* Published on May 12, 2008 in Lebanon's DAILY STAR, where Rami G. Khouri is published twice-weekly.
Events in Beirut and other parts of Lebanon continue to move erratically, with simultaneous gestures of political compromise and armed clashes that have left 46 dead in the past week. The consequences of what has happened in the past week may portend an extraordinary but constructive new development: the possible emergence of the first American-Iranian joint political governance system in the Arab world. Maybe. If Lebanon shifts from street clashes to the hoped-for political compromise through a renewed national dialogue process, it will have a national unity government whose two factions receive arms, training, funds and political support from both the United States and Iran. Should this happen, an unspoken American-Iranian political condominium in Lebanon could prove to be key to power-sharing and stability in other parts of the region, such as Palestine, Iraq and other hot spots. This would also mark a huge defeat for the United States and its failed diplomatic approach that seeks to confront, battle and crush the Islamist-nationalists throughout the region.
The brief, isolated, but intense clashes that occurred in the four days between Wednesday and Sunday threatened a total, Iraq-like collapse of Lebanon, with the Hizbullah-led alliance controlling power in the capital Beirut and other critical areas. The frantic pace of political and street action comprised and clarified four noteworthy developments, whose implications for the rest of the Middle East could be momentous: 1. When the government decided to challenge Hizbullah on Tuesday by announcing it was sacking the Shiite army general in charge of airport security and dismantling Hizbullah's underground security telecommunications network, Hizbullah saw this as the first serious attempt by the government to try and disarm it. Hizbullah immediately challenged the government, warned it against these decisions, and made a show of force to protect its security and telecommunications system. When street clashes started in several parts of Beirut, the Iranian- and Syrian-backed Hizbullah-led opposition alliance quickly and roundly asserted its dominance over the US- and Saudi-backed government alliance. Put to the test, the new balance of power in Lebanon affirmed itself on the street for the first time in less than 24 hours.2. All the Lebanese parties repeatedly indicated a preference for political compromise over communal war, but also showed they were prepared to fight if forced to. The persistent negotiations via the mass media included critical agreements on naming the armed forces commander, General Michel Suleiman, as the new president, resuming the national dialogue, forming a government of national unity, and revising the electoral law before holding parliamentary elections next year. Negotiating offers came in sequence from Hizbullah secretary general and Shiite leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Future Movement head and Sunni leader Saad Hariri, Sunni Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, and the Shiite Amal movement of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, a Hizbullah ally.3. The newly vulnerable government effectively backed down Saturday and reversed its two decisions, as Hizbullah had demanded. The street balance of power was translated into a new political equation inside Lebanon. Hizbullah and its allies had achieved on the street that which they had been asking for politically: the capacity to veto government decisions that were seen as threatening Hizbullah's security and resistance activities. 4. By immediately handing over to the armed forces those few buildings and strategic locations that they had taken over in Beirut, Hizbullah and its allies sent the signal that they did not want to rule the entire country, and that they trusted the army as a neutral arbiter between the warring Lebanese factions. Prime Minister Siniora sent the same message when he asked the armed forces and their commander, Suleiman, to decide on the fate of the two contested government security decisions that had sparked Hizbullah's move into West Beirut. The armed forces emerged as the powerful political arbiter and peace-keeper, effectively forming a fourth branch of government, and the only one that is credible and effective in the eyes of the entire population. All factions have agreed to get their gunmen off the streets and leave only the army and police as public security guardians. Now they are expected to follow up quickly by formally naming Suleiman as president (to which they have all agreed already), agreeing on a transitional national unity government of technocrats, and drawing up a new election law. The precise sequence of those events is one of the disputed points that must be agreed, but agreement may be easier now that the army has emerged as a pivotal arbiter and political actor.The new domestic political balance of power in Lebanon will reflect millennia-old indigenous Middle Eastern traditions of different and often quarreling parties that live together peacefully after negotiating power relationships, rather than one party totally defeating and humiliating the other. Lebanon can only exist as a single country if its multi-ethnic and multi-religious population shares power. As the political leaders now seek to do this, they operate in a new context where the strongest group comprises Iranian- and Syrian-backed Islamist Shiites and their junior partners, Christian and Sunni Lebanese allies. They will share power in a national unity government with fellow Lebanese who are friends, allies, dependents and proxies of the United States and Saudi Arabia. If a new Middle East truly is being born, this may well prove to be its nursery.
* Published on May 12, 2008 in Lebanon's DAILY STAR, where Rami G. Khouri is published twice-weekly.
Wednesday, April 23, 2008
Iraq lawmakers move to ban toy guns
Children imitating sectarian divides in war gamesIraqi lawmakers, alarmed at the exceptional levels of violence children are exposed to daily, are about to pass a bill to ban the import of toy guns, an MP said on Wednesday.
"Our children see too much violence on TV, they have it on their video games, they hear their parents talk about violence every day. It is rampant in the streets," parliamentary committee on women and children chairwoman Samira al-Mussawi told AFP.Saying the bill has already been approved by the cabinet, Mussawi expects it to come before parliament before the end of the week.
According to Mussawi, children do not distinguish between toy guns and the real thing.
"They use them without knowing the reality of violence or killing," she said.
"We have to stop importing these kinds of toys and give our children others that will help them develop their brains.
"The lawmaker called on the education ministry to introduce subjects in schools dealing with matters such as non-violent conflict resolution and reconciliation.
Members of her committee, she added, backed efforts by the Iraqi army to curb the number of toy guns on the streets by going to schools and asking children to hand in plastic weaponry in return for other, creative toys.
Plastic toy guns, many imported from China, flood the shelves of toy stores, with shopkeepers saying the weaponry is the top seller, both for boys and for girls. Prices range from 5,000 to 40,000 dinars (four to 32 dollars), with the MP7AI rifle the favorite, as it resembles the type of weapons children see in American movies, shopkeepers told AFP.
Teachers say Iraqi kids play cops and robbers as do children in most countries, but that they also play war games, based on what is happening in the streets of their towns and cities. In some neighborhoods, it's police versus "terrorists", or army versus al-Qaeda. In other areas war games reflect the bitter sectarian divides
-- one side gets to be Shiite militiamen, the other Sunni insurgents.The only psychological study carried out in Iraq since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 was on children by the Association of Psychologists of Iraq (API) in 2006.
It found that the violence was profoundly affecting them."The only things they have on their minds are guns, bullets, death and a fear of the U.S. occupation," said API spokesman Marwan Abdullah when he released the report.
Saturday, April 12, 2008
Iraqi blogger: Baghdad after Saddam
Iraq's first blogger, Salam Pax, was in Baghdad on April 9, 2003. He watched cautiously as the US military entered the capital and took down Saddam Hussein's government.
But hopes for a better future were soon replaced with fears of looters taking the city apart brick by brick.
Five years later, he recounts the trials and tribulations experienced by Iraqis who woke up for the first time in 24 years without a government led by Saddam Hussein.
The collected weblog has been published by Guardian Books under the title The Baghdad Blog. He also made 19 short documentaries about life in Iraq after the war and was awarded Royal Television Society's award for innovation in 2003.
The events in Baghdad in early April five years ago were so overwhelming that it took three days and a succession of four-hour TV news snippets for the predicament to sink in.
Electricity had been cut off for a couple of days and we had been using a small power generator for four hours during the day and night mainly to check the news.
My uncles and aunts were all staying at our house … we thought that if we were going to be shocked and awed into democracy, we really ought to go through the experience together.
On April 7, my father woke up everyone because he had heard on the radio that the US army had entered Baghdad.
The 15 members of my extended family sat silently in front of the television set and watched a live feed from a US network showing American tanks rolling towards a presidential palace in central Baghdad.
It almost felt like watching an implausible scene in a science fiction film. This was followed two days later by footage of the Saddam statue in Firdous square being pulled down.
No more Saddam
We watched with disbelief.
Could Saddam really be gone now? We stayed home with our doors locked and waited for the retaliation of the Iraqi army, but there was nothing.
Days later we would see Iraqi military uniforms tossed in ditches as if the army just disappeared into thin air.
Then the images of the looting started appearing on all the news channels. This time we watched with anger and my uncles returned to their own homes to make sure their belongings did not get 'liberated' as well.
In rapid succession, we moved within three days from fear of being bombed to hope for a better future and back to fear of the chaos on the street.
We could tell from the events unfolding in the street three days after the coalition forces moved into Baghdad how this invasion would likely conclude.
Iraqis have never really recovered from the chaos of those early days.
But the truth is I chose not to dwell on what was happening in the streets and held on instead to a hope for a better future.
And with every little step forward we would look at each other and say 'it's happening'. But these forward steps were usually just blips of good news in what felt like an endless stream of bad news.
Corpses
But it has become increasingly difficult today to remember what good I had once been hoping would come out of the war and regime change.
I am left with a lot of bad memories.
There were days when the Red Crescent was begging for volunteers to assist in retrieving the corpses from the streets and giving them proper burial.
The local hospital's garden had to be converted into a makeshift cemetery after the electricity went out; there was no way the bodies could be stored in refrigerated morgues until they were identified by next of kin.
My mother, after going out only once after Baghdad was taken by coalition forces, decided she we would never venture outside her front yard again.
Not until I promised her that stability had returned to the streets.
That never really happened.
Painful memories
Going out in the city became an exercise in blocking out painful images and scenes; in some cases there were areas of the city you plainly avoided.
Have you seen what has happened to Baghdad's book market? I would rather have the image of that street as I remember it in my mind than the reality of what is left of it today.
Eventually, we had to leave our home when my neighbourhood was taken over by Sunni militias - all my Shia uncles and aunts also left their homes with all their belongings. Then came the walls which transformed an ethnically mixed and vibrant city into a series of sectarian ghettos.
And can one ever forget the neverending Iraqi civilian casualties.
To be honest, I still have no idea how to refer to April 9, 2003. For a while, one of our shortlived early governments called it "Baghdad Liberation Day" but that feels like a contradiction in terms as foreign forces stormed the city and that usually is described as an invasion.
On the other hand, I never really could bring myself to describing it as the "Fall of Baghdad".
I thought we were never going to let that happen although after five years of mostly death and bloodshed my beloved city is certainly not what it used to be.
I don't want to say fallen. But Baghdad is unquestionably and deeply hurt.
Salam Pax is and Iraqi documentary film-maker and the author of The Baghdad Blog. He graduated as an architect from Baghdad university but turned to blogging in 2002.
But hopes for a better future were soon replaced with fears of looters taking the city apart brick by brick.
Five years later, he recounts the trials and tribulations experienced by Iraqis who woke up for the first time in 24 years without a government led by Saddam Hussein.
The collected weblog has been published by Guardian Books under the title The Baghdad Blog. He also made 19 short documentaries about life in Iraq after the war and was awarded Royal Television Society's award for innovation in 2003.
The events in Baghdad in early April five years ago were so overwhelming that it took three days and a succession of four-hour TV news snippets for the predicament to sink in.
Electricity had been cut off for a couple of days and we had been using a small power generator for four hours during the day and night mainly to check the news.
My uncles and aunts were all staying at our house … we thought that if we were going to be shocked and awed into democracy, we really ought to go through the experience together.
On April 7, my father woke up everyone because he had heard on the radio that the US army had entered Baghdad.
The 15 members of my extended family sat silently in front of the television set and watched a live feed from a US network showing American tanks rolling towards a presidential palace in central Baghdad.
It almost felt like watching an implausible scene in a science fiction film. This was followed two days later by footage of the Saddam statue in Firdous square being pulled down.
No more Saddam
We watched with disbelief.
Could Saddam really be gone now? We stayed home with our doors locked and waited for the retaliation of the Iraqi army, but there was nothing.
Days later we would see Iraqi military uniforms tossed in ditches as if the army just disappeared into thin air.
Then the images of the looting started appearing on all the news channels. This time we watched with anger and my uncles returned to their own homes to make sure their belongings did not get 'liberated' as well.
In rapid succession, we moved within three days from fear of being bombed to hope for a better future and back to fear of the chaos on the street.
We could tell from the events unfolding in the street three days after the coalition forces moved into Baghdad how this invasion would likely conclude.
Iraqis have never really recovered from the chaos of those early days.
But the truth is I chose not to dwell on what was happening in the streets and held on instead to a hope for a better future.
And with every little step forward we would look at each other and say 'it's happening'. But these forward steps were usually just blips of good news in what felt like an endless stream of bad news.
Corpses
But it has become increasingly difficult today to remember what good I had once been hoping would come out of the war and regime change.
I am left with a lot of bad memories.
There were days when the Red Crescent was begging for volunteers to assist in retrieving the corpses from the streets and giving them proper burial.
The local hospital's garden had to be converted into a makeshift cemetery after the electricity went out; there was no way the bodies could be stored in refrigerated morgues until they were identified by next of kin.
My mother, after going out only once after Baghdad was taken by coalition forces, decided she we would never venture outside her front yard again.
Not until I promised her that stability had returned to the streets.
That never really happened.
Painful memories
Going out in the city became an exercise in blocking out painful images and scenes; in some cases there were areas of the city you plainly avoided.
Have you seen what has happened to Baghdad's book market? I would rather have the image of that street as I remember it in my mind than the reality of what is left of it today.
Eventually, we had to leave our home when my neighbourhood was taken over by Sunni militias - all my Shia uncles and aunts also left their homes with all their belongings. Then came the walls which transformed an ethnically mixed and vibrant city into a series of sectarian ghettos.
And can one ever forget the neverending Iraqi civilian casualties.
To be honest, I still have no idea how to refer to April 9, 2003. For a while, one of our shortlived early governments called it "Baghdad Liberation Day" but that feels like a contradiction in terms as foreign forces stormed the city and that usually is described as an invasion.
On the other hand, I never really could bring myself to describing it as the "Fall of Baghdad".
I thought we were never going to let that happen although after five years of mostly death and bloodshed my beloved city is certainly not what it used to be.
I don't want to say fallen. But Baghdad is unquestionably and deeply hurt.
Salam Pax is and Iraqi documentary film-maker and the author of The Baghdad Blog. He graduated as an architect from Baghdad university but turned to blogging in 2002.
Monday, March 10, 2008
Tragedy of Israel and Palestine
Americans have grown so accustomed to the disastrous dynamics operating between Israelis and Palestinians today that the failure to reach a peace deal amid the soaring death tolls assumes an aura of normalcy in their minds.
This reflects a situation we imagine ourselves to be powerless to help change and only adds to the tragedy unfolding in the Occupied Territories and Israel as well.
Today the world's attention has turned to the aftermath of the murder of eight students of an ultra-Zionist Mercaz HaRav yeshiva, established by the founder of religious zionism, Rabbi Avraham Isaac Kook in 1924.
Last week the focus was the ongoing war in Gaza, which will likely be the centre of attention next week as well.
The attacks on religious students in the midst of study and prayer - coupled with the ongoing rocket attacks from Gaza on the Israeli towns of Sderot and Ashkelon - are already being offered as the latest examples of continued Palestinian unwillingness to make peace with Israel more than two years after its unprecedented withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.
World's largest prison
Shanbo Heinemann, a pro-Palestinian activist, is injured in a protest against the wall [GETTY] But there are many problems with this argument; firstly, most of the acts of Palestinian resistance to the occupation have always been non-violent.
Equally important is the fact that while Israeli civilians no longer live in Gaza, Israel's military presence has never ended.
Tel Aviv withdrew civilian settlers and then threw away the key to what has now become the world's largest prison.
Ariel Sharon, the former Israeli prime minister and the architect of the settlement movement, was willing to sacrifice Gaza in order to ensure Israel held onto the major settlement blocs of the West Bank, which today house more than 250,000 settlers (almost double that number if one includes the Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem).
The settler population of the West Bank also doubled during the years of the Oslo "peace" process - which began when Abu Dahim was about 12 and ended when he was 19 - without a whimper of complaint from the United States.
By the time Yitzhak Rabin, the former prime minister, was assassinated in 1995, Palestinian leaders were warning that the continued settlement expansion was "killing" the peace process and would sooner or later lead to a "revolution" from the street.
This reflects a situation we imagine ourselves to be powerless to help change and only adds to the tragedy unfolding in the Occupied Territories and Israel as well.
Today the world's attention has turned to the aftermath of the murder of eight students of an ultra-Zionist Mercaz HaRav yeshiva, established by the founder of religious zionism, Rabbi Avraham Isaac Kook in 1924.
Last week the focus was the ongoing war in Gaza, which will likely be the centre of attention next week as well.
The attacks on religious students in the midst of study and prayer - coupled with the ongoing rocket attacks from Gaza on the Israeli towns of Sderot and Ashkelon - are already being offered as the latest examples of continued Palestinian unwillingness to make peace with Israel more than two years after its unprecedented withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.
World's largest prison
Shanbo Heinemann, a pro-Palestinian activist, is injured in a protest against the wall [GETTY] But there are many problems with this argument; firstly, most of the acts of Palestinian resistance to the occupation have always been non-violent.
Equally important is the fact that while Israeli civilians no longer live in Gaza, Israel's military presence has never ended.
Tel Aviv withdrew civilian settlers and then threw away the key to what has now become the world's largest prison.
Ariel Sharon, the former Israeli prime minister and the architect of the settlement movement, was willing to sacrifice Gaza in order to ensure Israel held onto the major settlement blocs of the West Bank, which today house more than 250,000 settlers (almost double that number if one includes the Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem).
The settler population of the West Bank also doubled during the years of the Oslo "peace" process - which began when Abu Dahim was about 12 and ended when he was 19 - without a whimper of complaint from the United States.
By the time Yitzhak Rabin, the former prime minister, was assassinated in 1995, Palestinian leaders were warning that the continued settlement expansion was "killing" the peace process and would sooner or later lead to a "revolution" from the street.
The presence of well over 100 settlements has necessitated a matrix of control in which 80 per cent of the West Bank be declared off limits to Palestinians.
It also meant the destruction of thousands of homes and olive and fruit trees (the backbone of an otherwise closed Palestinian economy), the confiscation of 35,000 acres of Palestinian land, and the creation of a network of bypass roads, military bases.
The 400-kilometre, 8-metre-high "separation wall" also pierces deep into Palestinian territory, cutting into at least three isolated cantons.
Together, the settlement system has made the idea of creating a territorially and economically viable Palestinian state impossible to implement.
With the eruption of the al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000 whatever infrastructure of peace had been created during Oslo was quickly dismantled by both sides.
By mid-2002 Israel began deploying a strategy of managed chaos, in which a near total closure of the Territories, coupled with a destruction of much of their economic and political infrastructure, turned the intifada into what Palestinians term an "intifawda," a neologism that brings the violence of the intifada together with the chaos, or "fawda" of a society living in a barely functioning state and economy.
Dividing Palestine
Israel's separation wall cuts a broad path through Palestinian olive groves [GALLO/GETTY]Israeli planners gambled that by splitting the West Bank from Gaza, deepening the occupation of the former while freeing itself of the settlements in the latter, and routinely deploying disproportionate violence (including tanks, helicopter gunships, F-16s, and heavily armed troops) against all signs of resistance, Palestinian society would begin turning on itself.
Indeed, Israel hoped for this when it clandestinely supported the emergence of Hamas two decades ago, with the goal of building up a rival to the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) that would have them fighting each other rather than figuring out more successful strategies of fighting the occupation.
But, even as Palestinians fight each other, resistance to the occupation has continued. Most of it is comprised of various forms of non-violence (marches, sit-ins, and attempts to stop home demolitions or replant uprooted fields or groves).
These are rarely covered by the international media, and are usually met with violence by the Israeli military or settlers.
Fairly or not, however, it has been Palestinian violence, and especially suicide bombings and now rocket attacks on civilians, that have defined their resistance to the ongoing occupation.
Suicidal suicide attacks
It also meant the destruction of thousands of homes and olive and fruit trees (the backbone of an otherwise closed Palestinian economy), the confiscation of 35,000 acres of Palestinian land, and the creation of a network of bypass roads, military bases.
The 400-kilometre, 8-metre-high "separation wall" also pierces deep into Palestinian territory, cutting into at least three isolated cantons.
Together, the settlement system has made the idea of creating a territorially and economically viable Palestinian state impossible to implement.
With the eruption of the al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000 whatever infrastructure of peace had been created during Oslo was quickly dismantled by both sides.
By mid-2002 Israel began deploying a strategy of managed chaos, in which a near total closure of the Territories, coupled with a destruction of much of their economic and political infrastructure, turned the intifada into what Palestinians term an "intifawda," a neologism that brings the violence of the intifada together with the chaos, or "fawda" of a society living in a barely functioning state and economy.
Dividing Palestine
Israel's separation wall cuts a broad path through Palestinian olive groves [GALLO/GETTY]Israeli planners gambled that by splitting the West Bank from Gaza, deepening the occupation of the former while freeing itself of the settlements in the latter, and routinely deploying disproportionate violence (including tanks, helicopter gunships, F-16s, and heavily armed troops) against all signs of resistance, Palestinian society would begin turning on itself.
Indeed, Israel hoped for this when it clandestinely supported the emergence of Hamas two decades ago, with the goal of building up a rival to the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) that would have them fighting each other rather than figuring out more successful strategies of fighting the occupation.
But, even as Palestinians fight each other, resistance to the occupation has continued. Most of it is comprised of various forms of non-violence (marches, sit-ins, and attempts to stop home demolitions or replant uprooted fields or groves).
These are rarely covered by the international media, and are usually met with violence by the Israeli military or settlers.
Fairly or not, however, it has been Palestinian violence, and especially suicide bombings and now rocket attacks on civilians, that have defined their resistance to the ongoing occupation.
Suicidal suicide attacks
And in this regard the actions have been nothing short of suicidal - Palestinian "resistance" to the occupation seems to have been scripted by Israel as it has suited the interests of the Israeli governments in power since 2000. As Haaretz columnist Bradley Burston recently put it:
"The Palestinians have kept their ultimate doomsday weapon under tight wraps for 40 years ... Israeli senior commanders could only pray that the Palestinians would never take it out and put it to actual use ... non-violence. This is one reason why, for decades, Israel did its best to head off, harass, and crack down on expressions of Palestinian non-violence."
If Palestinians ever decided to just "get up and walk" en masse to the Erez Crossing separating Gaza from Israel and the major West Bank check points like Qalandiya and used hammers and picks to tear them down, there would be almost nothing Israel could do, short of a massacre in full view of the world's cameras.
But Palestinians have become so stuck in the ideology of summud, (which naturally become a national imperative after a million Palestinians were uprooted in the 1948 and 1967 wars), or defiantly staying put, that they have rarely taken the strategic or moral offensive.
When they applied the moral approach during the first intifada, Israel's harsh crackdown coupled with PLO dominance of Palestianian politics, ensured the de-politicisation and disempowerment of the first "intifada generation".
Two weeks ago, when a few brave Palestinians tried to organise a peaceful march to the Erez border crossing to build on the momentum gained by breaching the border fence between Gaza and Egypt, they were stopped far from the border by a line of heavily armed Hamas policemen.
Soon after, the day's ration of rockets was fired into the nearby Israeli town of Sderot, wounding two Israeli children.
Israel responded with a new rounds of attacks by Israel, killing and wounding more Palestinians.
How to stop?
A few years ago, in a particularly violent moment of the intifada, I interviewed a senior Hamas leader at his office in Gaza. After the usual boiler plate questions and answers, I finally grew exasperated and said to him, "Look, let's put aside the question of whether you have the right to use violence, particularly against civilians, to pursue your ends. The simple fact is that the strategy has not worked."
His response stunned me with its honesty: "We know the violence doesn't work, but we don't know how to stop."
In a mirror image of Israeli strategic thinking, Hamas has remained unable to break free of the dangerously outdated paradigm that says violence, particularly against civilians, can only be met by even more violence until the other side yields.
Aside from the moral turpitude of such thinking by both sides - not to mention blatant illegality according to international law - the reality, at least in the near term, is that the human and political cost of such a policy for Israel is far lower than for Palestinians, who have very little time left before their dreams of independence are crushed for good.
Ehud Olmert, Israel's prime minister, has himself admitted, the day Palestinians give up on the dream of an independent state will be the day Israel will "face a South African-style struggle for equal voting rights, and as soon as that happens, the state of Israel is finished."
Dysfunctional dynamics
In 1987, Meron Benvenisti, the former deputy mayor of Jerusalem, concluded his well-known "West Bank Data Base Project" report by arguing that the West Bank settlements were too integrated into Israel to separate them as part of any future peace dealBut so dysfunctional are the current dynamics that neither side seems willing to take the first step away from the abyss.
In such a situation, only a strong outside party can force the warring sides to make the hard compromises necessary to achieve a just and lasting peace.
This was the job the US signed up for in 1993, when Bill Clinton, then president, witnessed the signing of the first Oslo agreement on the White House lawn. But we have failed miserably in our self-appointed role as "honest broker."
It's not just that US has unapologetically taken Israel's side on almost every major issue since then.
During the Oslo years the US worked hand in glove with the Israeli and Palestinian security services to stifle dissent within Palestinian civil society, or the Legislative Council, to a process that was moving away from rather than towards a just and lasting peace.
And with the militarisation of US foreign policy after September 11 and the sullied occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, Israel has had even greater carte blanche to inflict precisely the kind of damage upon Palestinian society we are witnessing now in Gaza.
Blood of children
By refusing to press Israel - as many Israeli commentators, and an increasing number of US policy-makers as well, urge - to negotiate with Hamas we have not just enabled the current violence, but are directly responsible for it.
Hamas has declared its willingness to negotiate a two-state solution, albeit under conditions to which Israel has little incentive to accept.
The blood of Israeli and Palestinian children that appears on TV is on our hands too.
It would be nice if we could imagine that the next US president will have the courage to "change" this dynamic. But there is little chance of that.
The only hope is that Israeli and Palestinian societies come together to stop the violence their leaders keep inflicting on them before the delusions of victory on both sides cross the line into psychosis.
Mark LeVine is professor of history at UCI Irvine and author or editor of half a dozen books dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and globalisation in the Middle East, including Overthrowing Geography: Jaffa, Tel Aviv and the Struggle for Palestine, Reapproaching Borders: New Perspectives on the Study of Israel and Palestine, Why They Don't Hate Us: Lifting the Veil on the Axis of Evil, and the forthcoming An Impossible Peace: Oslo and the Burdens of History.
"The Palestinians have kept their ultimate doomsday weapon under tight wraps for 40 years ... Israeli senior commanders could only pray that the Palestinians would never take it out and put it to actual use ... non-violence. This is one reason why, for decades, Israel did its best to head off, harass, and crack down on expressions of Palestinian non-violence."
If Palestinians ever decided to just "get up and walk" en masse to the Erez Crossing separating Gaza from Israel and the major West Bank check points like Qalandiya and used hammers and picks to tear them down, there would be almost nothing Israel could do, short of a massacre in full view of the world's cameras.
But Palestinians have become so stuck in the ideology of summud, (which naturally become a national imperative after a million Palestinians were uprooted in the 1948 and 1967 wars), or defiantly staying put, that they have rarely taken the strategic or moral offensive.
When they applied the moral approach during the first intifada, Israel's harsh crackdown coupled with PLO dominance of Palestianian politics, ensured the de-politicisation and disempowerment of the first "intifada generation".
Two weeks ago, when a few brave Palestinians tried to organise a peaceful march to the Erez border crossing to build on the momentum gained by breaching the border fence between Gaza and Egypt, they were stopped far from the border by a line of heavily armed Hamas policemen.
Soon after, the day's ration of rockets was fired into the nearby Israeli town of Sderot, wounding two Israeli children.
Israel responded with a new rounds of attacks by Israel, killing and wounding more Palestinians.
How to stop?
A few years ago, in a particularly violent moment of the intifada, I interviewed a senior Hamas leader at his office in Gaza. After the usual boiler plate questions and answers, I finally grew exasperated and said to him, "Look, let's put aside the question of whether you have the right to use violence, particularly against civilians, to pursue your ends. The simple fact is that the strategy has not worked."
His response stunned me with its honesty: "We know the violence doesn't work, but we don't know how to stop."
In a mirror image of Israeli strategic thinking, Hamas has remained unable to break free of the dangerously outdated paradigm that says violence, particularly against civilians, can only be met by even more violence until the other side yields.
Aside from the moral turpitude of such thinking by both sides - not to mention blatant illegality according to international law - the reality, at least in the near term, is that the human and political cost of such a policy for Israel is far lower than for Palestinians, who have very little time left before their dreams of independence are crushed for good.
Ehud Olmert, Israel's prime minister, has himself admitted, the day Palestinians give up on the dream of an independent state will be the day Israel will "face a South African-style struggle for equal voting rights, and as soon as that happens, the state of Israel is finished."
Dysfunctional dynamics
In 1987, Meron Benvenisti, the former deputy mayor of Jerusalem, concluded his well-known "West Bank Data Base Project" report by arguing that the West Bank settlements were too integrated into Israel to separate them as part of any future peace dealBut so dysfunctional are the current dynamics that neither side seems willing to take the first step away from the abyss.
In such a situation, only a strong outside party can force the warring sides to make the hard compromises necessary to achieve a just and lasting peace.
This was the job the US signed up for in 1993, when Bill Clinton, then president, witnessed the signing of the first Oslo agreement on the White House lawn. But we have failed miserably in our self-appointed role as "honest broker."
It's not just that US has unapologetically taken Israel's side on almost every major issue since then.
During the Oslo years the US worked hand in glove with the Israeli and Palestinian security services to stifle dissent within Palestinian civil society, or the Legislative Council, to a process that was moving away from rather than towards a just and lasting peace.
And with the militarisation of US foreign policy after September 11 and the sullied occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, Israel has had even greater carte blanche to inflict precisely the kind of damage upon Palestinian society we are witnessing now in Gaza.
Blood of children
By refusing to press Israel - as many Israeli commentators, and an increasing number of US policy-makers as well, urge - to negotiate with Hamas we have not just enabled the current violence, but are directly responsible for it.
Hamas has declared its willingness to negotiate a two-state solution, albeit under conditions to which Israel has little incentive to accept.
The blood of Israeli and Palestinian children that appears on TV is on our hands too.
It would be nice if we could imagine that the next US president will have the courage to "change" this dynamic. But there is little chance of that.
The only hope is that Israeli and Palestinian societies come together to stop the violence their leaders keep inflicting on them before the delusions of victory on both sides cross the line into psychosis.
Mark LeVine is professor of history at UCI Irvine and author or editor of half a dozen books dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and globalisation in the Middle East, including Overthrowing Geography: Jaffa, Tel Aviv and the Struggle for Palestine, Reapproaching Borders: New Perspectives on the Study of Israel and Palestine, Why They Don't Hate Us: Lifting the Veil on the Axis of Evil, and the forthcoming An Impossible Peace: Oslo and the Burdens of History.
Tuesday, February 26, 2008
Negotiating peace
Dr. James J Zogby
This month the US Institute for Peace released Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East, the report of a study group which examined US peacemaking efforts over the past four decades.
Headed by Daniel Kurtzer (former US Ambassador to Egypt and Israel), the group met during 2006-2007 and interviewed over 100 officials and experts from seven countries and three international organisations.
The main body of the report is a look at successes and failures, and strengths and weaknesses of the past three administrations' efforts at Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking.
It concludes by detailing 10 lessons learned, and then outlining recommendations based on those lessons to guide the next administration.
The examination of Washington's peace making efforts during the past three administrations begins with a largely positive assessment of "Bush 41", crediting President George H.W. Bush for "having the clearest sense of strategy", which he pursued "in a highly disciplined, effective and committed manner.
The examination of Washington's peace making efforts during the past three administrations begins with a largely positive assessment of "Bush 41", crediting President George H.W. Bush for "having the clearest sense of strategy", which he pursued "in a highly disciplined, effective and committed manner.
" On the other hand, the major weakness of "Bush 41," pointed to in the report, was his "failure to build a strong coalition at home to support [his] strategy.
" It was the combination of this failure, and the distraction of his reelection effort in 1992, that caused the Bush Administration to lose focus in its peacemaking efforts.In spite of this, the report notes that the Clinton administration "inherited an ideal strategic environment for peacemaking.
" Noting that Clinton more effectively built a domestic support base for his peacemaking efforts, he was, however, "less disciplined and less strategic than his predecessor".
Specifically, the report noted that the Clinton team "failed to understand and deal with key asymmetries in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.
While the US paid attention to Israeli security requirements, less attention was devoted to Palestinian political requirements. The US did not find a way to compensate for Palestinian political weakness.
This was the first time in history a people under occupation was expected to negotiate its own way out of occupation while at the same time creating a viable, democratic and independent state".
The report notes that Clinton did not personally become directly involved in negotiations until late in his second term, and did not put forward his own peace plan until his last month in office. This was, of course, too late to make a difference.
It is George W. Bush's approach that receives the greatest criticism, the authors noting that "his approach to the conflict lacked both commitment and a sense of strategic purpose".
This, they suggest, was due to the fact that too many of the president's advisers dismissed the importance of Middle East peace, placing greater emphasis on their "regime change" and democratisation agendas.
No follow through
When Bush did become involved, however, it was mostly on the rhetorical level, with little or no follow through.
No follow through
When Bush did become involved, however, it was mostly on the rhetorical level, with little or no follow through.
Plans were announced, and mediators were dispatched in succession, ignored and undercut, and then dropped.
To some degree, this contributed to a widespread belief that the Administration's efforts lacked seriousness.
The result of this mismanagement and/or neglect has negatively affected not only Israelis and Palestinians, but US diplomacy in the broader region, and public attitudes towards the US itself. The report goes on to list a number of important lessons that must be heeded by any future administration.
Here are three:"Arab-Israeli peacemaking is in our national interest: September 11, Iraq and increasing instability in the Middle East have made US leadership in the peace process more, not less, important.
The president needs to indicate that the peace process is a priority and ensure that the administration acts accordingly.
"US policy must never be defined anywhere but in Washington. Consultations with the parties must take place and policy revisions based on these consultations are inevitable, but our policy must be seen as our own.""The peace process has moved beyond incrementalism and must aim for endgame solutions. This not only requires US leadership to help the parties make the necessary trade-offs on core issues, but also a commitment to an expanded diplomatic approach that involves key international and regional actors."The report provides both a useful history and thoughtful analysis, with which one can find little disagreement.
My concern, however, is that it comes too late.
If Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East is to be followed, it must be followed by a very determined president willing to use pressure and politics not only to bring Israelis and Palestinians together, but also to work to transform US, Israeli and Palestinian attitudes.
Can the Mideast avoid war?
The assassination of Hezbollah's top commander Emad Mughnieh in a car bombing in Damascus on February 12, and its substantial repercussions, raise a big question: Are we on the verge of a new war?
With Mughnieh's murder, its timing, location and method, as well as with the subsequent threats by Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah against Israel, it seems that our region is on the threshold of a possible war.
Nasrallah threatened Israel with an "open war" and vowed to avenge the death of Mughnieh, which he believes will bring about major changes in the Middle East and "mark the beginning of demise" of the Israeli state.
Addressing his supporters, Nasrallah said: "I swear to God that Mughnieh's blood will not go in vain," and predicted the disappearance of Israel. This is a clear sign that a war will break out in the region. The rising tensions and security concerns in the region will probably lead to more divisions between Arab countries.
Mughnieh's assassination drew different reactions from Arab governments, which are deeply divided between two camps - the American camp and the Iranian camp. Meanwhile, the Arab street appears to be even more deeply entrenched in its divisions.
For instance, Kuwait saw a sectarian divide over the assassination of Mughnieh after two Shiite parliament members held a ceremony to eulogise Hezbollah's slain commander.
Two dead
The ceremony drew condemnations from Kuwaiti's majority Sunnis, who accused Mughnieh of the 1988 hijacking of a Kuwait Airways flight that left two Kuwaiti passengers dead, and the assassination attempt on the Kuwaiti Emir in 1985.The Kuwaiti government criticised those who took part in the rally amid popular calls for stripping the membership - even citizenship - of the two Shiite MPs, especially given that the government had earlier stripped Sulaiman Bu Gaith, a top Al Qaida leader, of his citizenship.
The repercussions of Mughnieh's killing spread across Kuwait, Lebanon, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Damascus, Washington and Tehran, which reacted differently to the fiery statements of Nasrallah who declared open war against Israel under new game rules.
Nasrallah made it clear when he spoke about a borderless war after Israel crossed the borders and killed Mughnieh in the Syrian capital, outside the natural battlefield.Speaking of a war that goes beyond geographic borders brings us closer to a war scenario being drawn up in the region.
In Lebanon, the political rift is deepening between the pro-government group and the Hezbollah-led opposition.
This is reflected by the exchange of accusations between the leaders of both sides.The pro-government group refers to the opposition as evil gangs and dark forces affiliated to the Syrian regime, while the opposition in turn brands their rivals as Washington's allies.
The conflict between the two sides was manifested clearly on February 14 when the Lebanese were divided into two rallies, one gathered in the Martyrs Square to commemorate the third anniversary of the killing of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, while the Hezbollah supporters took part in Mughnieh's funeral.Even more, the failure of the Arab plan to resolve the presidential crisis is another source of concern.
Also, the calls by the Saudi and Kuwaiti governments on their citizens not to travel to Lebanon, as well as the threat to bomb the Kuwaiti embassy in Beirut and the closure of two French cultural centres, will contribute to the deteriorating situation in the already paralysed country.
Change in rules
Mughnieh's assassination would only accelerate the confrontation with Israel and the US, which changed the rules of the game. Backed by General Michael Aoun, leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, Hezbollah believes that victims of aggression have the right to defend themselves, while Nasrallah insists that Mughnieh's assassination will mark the beginning of Israel's elimination.
This was reiterated by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Mohammad Ali Jafari, Commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards, who sent to Nasrallah a cable of condolences describing Israel as a cancerous cell that will be removed by Hezbollah.
Moreover, US President George W. Bush has fanned the confrontation by imposing new punishments on Syrian officials, including Rami Makhlouf, cousin of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad.
Bush also doubled the US financial support to $14 million for the international tribunal into the Hariri killing, while Syria said it had many options to retaliate against the US penalties. Iran expressed its anger at Mughnieh's assassination by sending an official delegation, led by Iranian Foreign Minister Manocher Mottaki, to attend the funeral, and by sending cables of condolences to Nasrallah.
Meanwhile, Tehran announced that the Iranian president would visit Baghdad, which is under "the US protection", and cancelled a meeting of Iranian experts with their American counterparts.The situation escalated between the two countries after the US accused Iran of supporting armed groups in Iraq, which may lead to increasing violence that coincides with the withdrawal of some US troops from Iraq in the summer.
If the cycle of violence in Iraq captures the headlines in the US media again, the chances of Republican candidate John McCain winning the presidential race will weaken. So, the question arises: Will Mughnieh's assassination be a ticking time bomb that threatens the region with a devastating war to determine the results of the struggle between the US and Iranian projects?No matter what the outcome of this struggle will be, Arab territory will be the battlefield and the Arabs will be the victims.
* Published in the UAE's GULF NEWS on February 25, 2008. Dr Abdullah Al Shayji is a Professor of International Relations and Head of the American Studies Unit
With Mughnieh's murder, its timing, location and method, as well as with the subsequent threats by Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah against Israel, it seems that our region is on the threshold of a possible war.
Nasrallah threatened Israel with an "open war" and vowed to avenge the death of Mughnieh, which he believes will bring about major changes in the Middle East and "mark the beginning of demise" of the Israeli state.
Addressing his supporters, Nasrallah said: "I swear to God that Mughnieh's blood will not go in vain," and predicted the disappearance of Israel. This is a clear sign that a war will break out in the region. The rising tensions and security concerns in the region will probably lead to more divisions between Arab countries.
Mughnieh's assassination drew different reactions from Arab governments, which are deeply divided between two camps - the American camp and the Iranian camp. Meanwhile, the Arab street appears to be even more deeply entrenched in its divisions.
For instance, Kuwait saw a sectarian divide over the assassination of Mughnieh after two Shiite parliament members held a ceremony to eulogise Hezbollah's slain commander.
Two dead
The ceremony drew condemnations from Kuwaiti's majority Sunnis, who accused Mughnieh of the 1988 hijacking of a Kuwait Airways flight that left two Kuwaiti passengers dead, and the assassination attempt on the Kuwaiti Emir in 1985.The Kuwaiti government criticised those who took part in the rally amid popular calls for stripping the membership - even citizenship - of the two Shiite MPs, especially given that the government had earlier stripped Sulaiman Bu Gaith, a top Al Qaida leader, of his citizenship.
The repercussions of Mughnieh's killing spread across Kuwait, Lebanon, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Damascus, Washington and Tehran, which reacted differently to the fiery statements of Nasrallah who declared open war against Israel under new game rules.
Nasrallah made it clear when he spoke about a borderless war after Israel crossed the borders and killed Mughnieh in the Syrian capital, outside the natural battlefield.Speaking of a war that goes beyond geographic borders brings us closer to a war scenario being drawn up in the region.
In Lebanon, the political rift is deepening between the pro-government group and the Hezbollah-led opposition.
This is reflected by the exchange of accusations between the leaders of both sides.The pro-government group refers to the opposition as evil gangs and dark forces affiliated to the Syrian regime, while the opposition in turn brands their rivals as Washington's allies.
The conflict between the two sides was manifested clearly on February 14 when the Lebanese were divided into two rallies, one gathered in the Martyrs Square to commemorate the third anniversary of the killing of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, while the Hezbollah supporters took part in Mughnieh's funeral.Even more, the failure of the Arab plan to resolve the presidential crisis is another source of concern.
Also, the calls by the Saudi and Kuwaiti governments on their citizens not to travel to Lebanon, as well as the threat to bomb the Kuwaiti embassy in Beirut and the closure of two French cultural centres, will contribute to the deteriorating situation in the already paralysed country.
Change in rules
Mughnieh's assassination would only accelerate the confrontation with Israel and the US, which changed the rules of the game. Backed by General Michael Aoun, leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, Hezbollah believes that victims of aggression have the right to defend themselves, while Nasrallah insists that Mughnieh's assassination will mark the beginning of Israel's elimination.
This was reiterated by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Mohammad Ali Jafari, Commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards, who sent to Nasrallah a cable of condolences describing Israel as a cancerous cell that will be removed by Hezbollah.
Moreover, US President George W. Bush has fanned the confrontation by imposing new punishments on Syrian officials, including Rami Makhlouf, cousin of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad.
Bush also doubled the US financial support to $14 million for the international tribunal into the Hariri killing, while Syria said it had many options to retaliate against the US penalties. Iran expressed its anger at Mughnieh's assassination by sending an official delegation, led by Iranian Foreign Minister Manocher Mottaki, to attend the funeral, and by sending cables of condolences to Nasrallah.
Meanwhile, Tehran announced that the Iranian president would visit Baghdad, which is under "the US protection", and cancelled a meeting of Iranian experts with their American counterparts.The situation escalated between the two countries after the US accused Iran of supporting armed groups in Iraq, which may lead to increasing violence that coincides with the withdrawal of some US troops from Iraq in the summer.
If the cycle of violence in Iraq captures the headlines in the US media again, the chances of Republican candidate John McCain winning the presidential race will weaken. So, the question arises: Will Mughnieh's assassination be a ticking time bomb that threatens the region with a devastating war to determine the results of the struggle between the US and Iranian projects?No matter what the outcome of this struggle will be, Arab territory will be the battlefield and the Arabs will be the victims.
* Published in the UAE's GULF NEWS on February 25, 2008. Dr Abdullah Al Shayji is a Professor of International Relations and Head of the American Studies Unit
Monday, February 18, 2008
Hating Islam Is the Same Thing as Hating Muslims
“I don’t hate Muslims. I hate Islam.” Of course, these are not my words and certainly not my sentiments. They are the words of a Dutch politician.
I will not reveal his name, nor talk about the film he is allegedly making, because I do not wish to pander to his need for media attention, and I certainly do not wish to give his film free publicity.
Besides, how can I have a meaningful view about a film that no one has seen? But his words exist; they are in the public sphere. In a newspaper interview this week, he calls Islam “the ideology of a retarded culture” and goes on to say that “Islam is something we can’t afford any more in the Netherlands.
That means no more mosques, no more Islamic schools, no more imams...Not all Muslims are terrorists, but almost all terrorists are Muslims
I suspect this is hitting many readers like a red rag to a bull, but I am keeping my calm for the moment, aware that the man’s intention is to provoke me. Are his words offensive?
Yes. Are they insulting? Yes. Are they lies? Yes. His words anger me, but what strikes me most about them is how familiar they seem. They are words we don’t normally hear from politicians or people in the public sphere, but they are words you hear if you listen carefully on European streets, and elsewhere too, I imagine.
So the first question I ask myself is this: If these views — as offensive as they are — exist, should they be aired in public so that Muslims can at least have a chance to counter them, or should they be outlawed? A second question is could a politician have uttered the same words about another religion, say Christianity or Judaism? And finally, could anyone seriously make a distinction between hating a religion and hating the people who profess its faith? There is a fine line between expressing a view in order to open up a debate, and giving credibility to a view by making it part of public discourse.
The sentence “I hate Islam” is one that will shock regardless of whether or not you are a Muslim. I suspect most Dutch people, even those who feel threatened by immigration or who hold negative views about Islam, will respond negatively to the strong emotive nature of the words used.
it is not acceptable to hate a religion. If anything, the politician has scored something of an own goal by using these words. Far more worrying in terms of impact is the rest of his discourse, in particular the sentence: “Not all Muslims are terrorists, but almost all terrorists are Muslims”.
it is of concern because it is fast becoming a mainstream view.
So is it true? I say no without hesitating because in my mind those who commit murder in the name of Islam are not Muslims, but I concede that this is a facile argument
The academic answer I am assured is also no
If you do a head count of terrorists on the planet past and present, you will find that Muslims do not make up the majority
I have not done a head count and nor do I wish to. It is sadly a reality that we regularly see terrorist acts committed by people born Muslims and it is also sadly a reality that in the eyes of many, violence is becoming a significant part of what defines Islam
I may see Islam as a religion of peace but that is no longer a majority view in the West. So, to return to the question in hand, I prefer to see a sentence like this one out in the public domain, as it refers to an issue that needs to be debated and refuted. Do I think an intelligent debate is forthcoming? Possibly not, certainly not if we focus on being offended instead of focusing on explaining why such comments are offensive.
Could a European politician have made these comments about another religion? As a rule of thumb, laws are tough against racism and relatively more lenient toward attacking religious beliefs.
Hence the politician would not only have committed political suicide if he had said he hated Jews, but would also have opened himself up to being prosecuted
Since Islam, and Christianity too for that matter, are religions but not races, offending Muslims or Christians does not carry the same weight as offending Sikhs or Jews. Add the current political equation to the mix and it seems evident that it would be unthinkable to see this kind of language used about any religion other than Islam in today’s political climate. Criticizing Islam is not the same as attacking Muslims
The first may be offensive to most Muslims but is acceptable to most Westerners.
It may be unacceptable to many Muslims reading this piece but in countries where freedom of speech is a fundamental value, criticizing a religion is considered healthy. Frankly, I sometimes find it hard to understand the knee-jerk reaction I often see at any hint of disagreement.
Islam is far too great a religion to be damaged by a little debate. Reading points of view I disagree with does not cause even a hairline fracture in my religious beliefs. Quite the contrary
The more I challenge my beliefs, the more convincing they become and surely that is how faith should be
But the Dutch politician was careful with his words.
He did not say he hated Muslims, he said he hated Islam. In his view, he is merely criticizing an ideology, not attacking a people
But when I read his words I felt personally attacked.
He is not criticizing my religion; he is expressing hate in the set of beliefs that makes me a Muslim.
He is very clearly expressing hatred for Muslims and his affirming the contrary only makes it all the more offensive to Muslims. His words not only offend me but more importantly threaten me. I accept being offended. I do not accept being hated for what I believe in.
* Published in Saudi Arabia's ARAB TIMES on Feb. 18. 2008.
Iman Kurdi
I will not reveal his name, nor talk about the film he is allegedly making, because I do not wish to pander to his need for media attention, and I certainly do not wish to give his film free publicity.
Besides, how can I have a meaningful view about a film that no one has seen? But his words exist; they are in the public sphere. In a newspaper interview this week, he calls Islam “the ideology of a retarded culture” and goes on to say that “Islam is something we can’t afford any more in the Netherlands.
That means no more mosques, no more Islamic schools, no more imams...Not all Muslims are terrorists, but almost all terrorists are Muslims
I suspect this is hitting many readers like a red rag to a bull, but I am keeping my calm for the moment, aware that the man’s intention is to provoke me. Are his words offensive?
Yes. Are they insulting? Yes. Are they lies? Yes. His words anger me, but what strikes me most about them is how familiar they seem. They are words we don’t normally hear from politicians or people in the public sphere, but they are words you hear if you listen carefully on European streets, and elsewhere too, I imagine.
So the first question I ask myself is this: If these views — as offensive as they are — exist, should they be aired in public so that Muslims can at least have a chance to counter them, or should they be outlawed? A second question is could a politician have uttered the same words about another religion, say Christianity or Judaism? And finally, could anyone seriously make a distinction between hating a religion and hating the people who profess its faith? There is a fine line between expressing a view in order to open up a debate, and giving credibility to a view by making it part of public discourse.
The sentence “I hate Islam” is one that will shock regardless of whether or not you are a Muslim. I suspect most Dutch people, even those who feel threatened by immigration or who hold negative views about Islam, will respond negatively to the strong emotive nature of the words used.
it is not acceptable to hate a religion. If anything, the politician has scored something of an own goal by using these words. Far more worrying in terms of impact is the rest of his discourse, in particular the sentence: “Not all Muslims are terrorists, but almost all terrorists are Muslims”.
it is of concern because it is fast becoming a mainstream view.
So is it true? I say no without hesitating because in my mind those who commit murder in the name of Islam are not Muslims, but I concede that this is a facile argument
The academic answer I am assured is also no
If you do a head count of terrorists on the planet past and present, you will find that Muslims do not make up the majority
I have not done a head count and nor do I wish to. It is sadly a reality that we regularly see terrorist acts committed by people born Muslims and it is also sadly a reality that in the eyes of many, violence is becoming a significant part of what defines Islam
I may see Islam as a religion of peace but that is no longer a majority view in the West. So, to return to the question in hand, I prefer to see a sentence like this one out in the public domain, as it refers to an issue that needs to be debated and refuted. Do I think an intelligent debate is forthcoming? Possibly not, certainly not if we focus on being offended instead of focusing on explaining why such comments are offensive.
Could a European politician have made these comments about another religion? As a rule of thumb, laws are tough against racism and relatively more lenient toward attacking religious beliefs.
Hence the politician would not only have committed political suicide if he had said he hated Jews, but would also have opened himself up to being prosecuted
Since Islam, and Christianity too for that matter, are religions but not races, offending Muslims or Christians does not carry the same weight as offending Sikhs or Jews. Add the current political equation to the mix and it seems evident that it would be unthinkable to see this kind of language used about any religion other than Islam in today’s political climate. Criticizing Islam is not the same as attacking Muslims
The first may be offensive to most Muslims but is acceptable to most Westerners.
It may be unacceptable to many Muslims reading this piece but in countries where freedom of speech is a fundamental value, criticizing a religion is considered healthy. Frankly, I sometimes find it hard to understand the knee-jerk reaction I often see at any hint of disagreement.
Islam is far too great a religion to be damaged by a little debate. Reading points of view I disagree with does not cause even a hairline fracture in my religious beliefs. Quite the contrary
The more I challenge my beliefs, the more convincing they become and surely that is how faith should be
But the Dutch politician was careful with his words.
He did not say he hated Muslims, he said he hated Islam. In his view, he is merely criticizing an ideology, not attacking a people
But when I read his words I felt personally attacked.
He is not criticizing my religion; he is expressing hate in the set of beliefs that makes me a Muslim.
He is very clearly expressing hatred for Muslims and his affirming the contrary only makes it all the more offensive to Muslims. His words not only offend me but more importantly threaten me. I accept being offended. I do not accept being hated for what I believe in.
* Published in Saudi Arabia's ARAB TIMES on Feb. 18. 2008.
Iman Kurdi
Monday, October 1, 2007
The Danish Caricatures Of Prophet Mohammad
The trend of European Islam(From the book "The Danish Caricatures Of Prophet Mohammad" By Mohey Eldin Gharib June 2007 )
Daniel Pipes, the supporter of “clash of civilizations” idea says: “we must support moderate Moslems to reach finally a clash "between two ideologies, Armed Islam and European Islam so that Moslems can have a suitable position in the world
Lately during the drawings’ crisis in Denmark, opinions mixed and media had quitted a number of descriptions of Islam. Beside extreme Islam there was armed Islam and cultural Islam and critical Islam scientific, democratic and moderate Islam. And lately there was European Islam.
Maybe in future there will be accepted Islam. And yet, politicians reduced it all to either of two things either Moslems in Denmark agree to the publishing of the drawings or they are against free expression (the American way).
Maybe in future there will be accepted Islam. And yet, politicians reduced it all to either of two things either Moslems in Denmark agree to the publishing of the drawings or they are against free expression (the American way).
Some Moslem politicians, headed by Naser Khader (Danish parliament member from the Radical Party) rushed to establish a Moslem moderates’ gathering. It had about a thousand members of Moslem moderates.
The name was later changed to “gathering of democratic Moslems”.
The name was later changed to “gathering of democratic Moslems”.
This time they became democratic Moslems. That was to them the ideal practical answer to face the drawings’ crisis and to escape it at the same time. Naser Khader had this answer and donated it to the Danish government as a political act or maybe for other reasons.
The government and rightist parties welcomed it and asked Moslems to join it – so if a Moslem immigrant to Denmark wants to be moderate democratic, he can just join this gathering. But polls and studies made by specialized bodies showed that the followers of Imams and Moslem preachers in Denmark are no more than 15%, and the followers of democratic Moslems are just 5%. So the overwhelming majority of 70-80% of Moslems is those who want to be Moslems without titles. They do not want to be different from the rest of society except by their descent.
They want to breath security and practice their democratic right and their right to free expression without putting on their backs a sign saying that they are moderate or democratic. Of course they do not dream of applying Moslem sharïa in Denmark or elsewhere.
And of course they get offended when religions are insulted, prophets molested, innocent people die and embassies burned.
They believe in peaceful demonstrations, boycott and resistance of injustice to regain rights. Most Danes share their views.
This great majority of Danish Moslems does not want to mix religion with politics- the question of religion should remain a private matter between man and God, whoever that God is.
Belief is a man’s need to reach internal equilibrium, each in his own way.
The trend of European Islam or democratic Moslems which they want to generalize in the West is a contradicting one by all measures.
It will first of all, lead to split between European Moslems and remaining Moslems in the world, which might lead to ideological clash that helps great powers to dominate the world, this time under the pretext of defending the democratic Moslems of Europe.
Secondly, it will lead to more split of elites in the same society.
For instance a Moslem can be denied certain jobs under the pretext that he is not a member of the democratic gathering. Of course employers will prefer this freedom of choice.
In fact it was announced by a Danish employer, Asger Aamund, that he will give jobs especially to members of this gathering.
Thirdly, the biggest contradiction will be mixing religion with politics, which violates the basic democratic rules and reduces Denmark’s and European’s credibility about democratic reform in Moslem countries.
The trend of European Islam, and the attempt to generalize it in the West seems to some a pragmatic way that may facilitate relations of the West and Islam and increase understanding.
But, beside the contradictions mentioned above the existence of middle men in the relation between the Danish society and the Moslem community- which in this case the gathering of democratic Moslems who do not represent the ordinary Moslem, will end up in a new form of monopoly of Islam as an alternative to Imams and preachers. Of course they will be politically exploited.
The leader of European Islam idea in Switzerland, Tareq Ramadan, criticized the escalation of the drawings’ crisis in Denmark saying that it was letter to solve it internally.
He ignored that the offence was not directed only to Danish Moslems but Moslems worldwide, who have the right to answer.
He ignored that such crises cannot be hidden from media and T.V. channels. The leader of democratic Moslems idea in Denmark, Naser Khader, known for his position among opposition parties wanted, as a politician to reduce the crisis to a political project.
Naser Khader says in a book about “Islam in Denmark”: “one of the biggest problems for Moslems in Denmark is their lack of a democratic tolerant leadership which accepts bargain, and broad minded enough to gather Moslems under one umbrella”.
This is exactly what Naser Khader misses. Such a leadership will push Moslems into the web of politics, and into a political party to defend their requirements and to have a Moslem candidate, i.e. a state within the state, the thing that most ordinary Moslems reject. It is rejected even in Moslem countries.
The big majority of ordinary Moslems does not want to be pushed in such political web. It wants fulfill its aims within the Danish constitution where every person chooses the party that satisfies his needs. This majority does not want to be represented by Imams and preachers or to turn to them as alternative to government bodies.
Their role should not exceed religious teachings. The danger of European Islam is pushing religion to be a political movement liable to criticism. A religion liable to deviation and control to suit political aims, in contrast to the civil modernization project which relies on making religion neutral of politics.
With due respect to the efforts of heightened persons like Naser Khader in Denmark and Tareq Ramadan in Switzerland and Basem Tiby in Sweden, whose good intentions and sincere desire to uplift the image of Islam I do not doubt, I hope that they reconsider their opinion and assemble their efforts to help
the great majority of Moslem immigrants and their descendants to assimilate into the societies in which they live, away from extremism either religious or rightist.
Thursday, September 27, 2007
Arab nations slam Israel for having nukes
U.N. rights chief urges Israel to have mercy on Gaza
Arab nations have condemned Israel for having nuclear weapons, on Friday the final day of a general conference of the U.N. watchdog International Atomic Energy Agency.Omani ambassador Salim Mohammed al-Riyami presented the agenda item "Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat" saying there was concern over the "failure of the universality" of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since Israel refuses to sign it.Israel neither confirms nor denies it has nuclear weapons, although it is believed to have some 200 atom bombs.
"Israel still benefits from total freedom to develop its nuclear capacities," Riyami told the 144 member states of the IAEA, which uses safeguard agreements to monitor compliance with the NPT.Riyami had said in a document submitted along with the agenda item: "The policies of successive Israeli government have obstructed the peace process in the Middle East and all initiatives to free the region . . . of weapons of mass destruction, and in particular of nuclear weapons, have failed.
"Israel still benefits from total freedom to develop its nuclear capacities," Riyami told the 144 member states of the IAEA, which uses safeguard agreements to monitor compliance with the NPT.Riyami had said in a document submitted along with the agenda item: "The policies of successive Israeli government have obstructed the peace process in the Middle East and all initiatives to free the region . . . of weapons of mass destruction, and in particular of nuclear weapons, have failed.
"The IAEA was also set to debate a resolution on safeguards, with Arab nations pushing for changes in the text to target Israel for having nuclear weapons.At the conference which began Monday Arab states on Thursday pushed through a resolution clearly aimed at Israel, calling for a Middle East free of nuclear weapons.The general conference approves broad policy lines for the IAEA.But the IAEA's 35-nation board of governors, which meets separately from the general conference, makes decisions for the agency on how policy is implemented
Meanwhile the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour urged Israel to exercise restraint in its dealings with the Hamas-led Gaza Strip. In a statement voicing concern at Israel's decision on Wednesday to declare Gaza an "enemy entity", Arbour said reducing fuel and power to the coastal territory would place an "unbearable burden" on its 1.5 million people.
Arbour reminded Israel of its obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law not to use disproportionate means or resort to collective punishment. Arbour condemned the indiscriminate firing of rockets into Israel by Palestinian militants in Gaza and said that Gaza had already paid a "heavy price" from daily violence, isolation and deprivation. After three months of nearly complete closure, the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip is "critical", Angelo Gnaedinger, director-general of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), said on Friday on return from Gaza. The agricultural sector is particularly affected,
as most produce is grown for export, while most industrial and other businesses have had to close down, the ICRC said in a statement. The operation of Gaza's water and sewage facilities has been impaired by military incursions, import restrictions, extensive damage to Gaza power station and interruptions to fuel supplies, the Swiss-based aid agency said. An ICRC assessment of nine hospitals in the Gaza Strip found that the hospital infrastructure is deteriorating rapidly, it said.
"Many facilities, diagnostic machines and other equipment are either out of order or in bad condition,
as it is no longer possible to maintain them properly," the ICRC said. The transfer of Gaza patients allowed to go into Israel, Jerusalem and the West Bank for medical treatment had slowed to a "trickle", compared with the previous daily rate of 30 to 40 since the Hamas takeover in June, according to the ICRC
Convenient racism
Racism is, among many things, convenient. It provides simplified, definite and ready-to-serve answers to complex questions. Racists come from all walks of life; their motivation and the root cause of their contemptible views of others may differ, but the outcome of these views is predictably the same - racial discrimination, social and political oppression, religious persecution and war.
The textual definition of racism pertains only to race, but in practice, racism is a consequence of group think, whereby a group of people starts delineating its relationship with other collectives - or other people in general - with a sense of supremacy.
When coupled with economic and/or political dominance, supremacy translates into various forms of subjugation and cruelty.
The adulation of the self-collective and the disparagement of the other is an ancient practice, as old as human civilisation.
It is everlasting for the simple reason that it has always served as a political and economic tool and will likely remain effective as long as the quest for political and material power drives human behaviour.
The issue is not always as straightforward as black and white. For example, less economically advantaged Eastern Europeans seeking (competing for) employment in Western Europe find themselves all lumped in the same group and subject to all sorts of classifications. Equally convenient has been the caricatured misrepresentation of Arabs by mainstream media, which serves to further specific political and economic interests.Ironically, an extreme form of racism also exists in various Arab countries, where foreign workers find themselves placed in a demeaning hierarchy based on country of origin. Western European and Americans top the scale and are readily accommodated, while Southeast Asians are often at the bottom. A very qualified Indian engineer, for example, may find himself getting paid much less than a French engineer with relatively little experience.In some countries, like South Africa, racism has wrecked havoc on society for generations. It manifests itself in the refusal of some people to identify with their ancestral cultures because they fear that such affinity would negate the fact that they are “full” South African citizens (a right for which they fought a most arduous fight).In Malaysia, which exhibits considerable social harmony when compared to some of it neighbours, racial classification is still very real. Despite the government’s commendable efforts to accentuate the Malaysian national model while carefully underscoring the Malay, Chinese or Indian sub-groupings, members of these groups are wary of their statistical representation in Malaysian society. Some react by stressing their number in comparison to that of other groups, while others tirelessly underscore the types of discrimination they experience at the hands of those with the political and economic advantages.While racism is universally recognised, few individuals would admit to their own prejudices and racist tendencies.
Moreover, it would be self-deceiving to view racism as a purely Western phenomenon.
While the Western model of racism, influenced by 18th-century colonialism, is unique in many respects, group prejudices based on class, race and religion are shared almost equally by all nations.The racism of those with political, military and economic power is often violent and detrimental, but it is important to remember that the underdog can be just as racist.An Arab reader from London sent me an e-mail demanding that I explain myself for collaborating on various projects with some well-known Jewish authors. “You are either naïve or you are selling out,” she wrote.
It made no difference to her that these authors are anti-Zionist and have been, for many years, on the frontline of the struggle for Palestinian rights and justice. She simply couldn’t break away from a deeply ingrained racist belief that “Jews are not to be trusted”.Of course, this is not an Arab, but a global predisposition; prolonged conflicts and wars tend to validate and inflate already existing prejudices.Although the Israeli educational system has produced generations of students saturated with grossly misleading images of Arabs and Palestinians, the relationship between Arabs and Jews hasn’t always been negative.
For centuries, both groups lived in harmony; some of the best Arab poets of past times were Jews and some of the most luminous Jewish texts were written originally in Arabic.
Unfortunately, conflict and war have a way of undermining such facts; racism in Israel is so intense now that few dare use the term “Arab Jew”.
When it is not a matter of race, some people seem to slide easily into greater tribal memberships that divide the world into “us” and “them”, often using words of negation and utilising religion. The “non” prefix becomes very useful here - “non-Muslim”, “non-Jew”, “non-Christian”, and so on.
Such negations are never well-intended and always produce negative results. Less apprehensive terms such as “non-democratic” (a neocolonial equivalent to “uncivilised”, perhaps?) could be similarly loaded and dangerous and are often used to promote and justify war.
A true fight against racism and various other types of group prejudice require, first, accepting personal responsibility in shaping one’s own society, and this includes the racism that exists within. Martin Luther King, Jr. refused “to accept the view that mankind is so tragically bound to the starless midnight of racism and war that the bright daybreak of peace and brotherhood can never become a reality”.
We all must uncompromisingly reject such a view as well, if we truly wish for peace, harmony and equality to replace war, social discord and injustice.
* Published in the JORDAN TIMES on September 26, 2007.
The writer is a Palestinian-American author and editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is “The Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People’s Struggle” (Pluto Press, London).
The textual definition of racism pertains only to race, but in practice, racism is a consequence of group think, whereby a group of people starts delineating its relationship with other collectives - or other people in general - with a sense of supremacy.
When coupled with economic and/or political dominance, supremacy translates into various forms of subjugation and cruelty.
The adulation of the self-collective and the disparagement of the other is an ancient practice, as old as human civilisation.
It is everlasting for the simple reason that it has always served as a political and economic tool and will likely remain effective as long as the quest for political and material power drives human behaviour.
The issue is not always as straightforward as black and white. For example, less economically advantaged Eastern Europeans seeking (competing for) employment in Western Europe find themselves all lumped in the same group and subject to all sorts of classifications. Equally convenient has been the caricatured misrepresentation of Arabs by mainstream media, which serves to further specific political and economic interests.Ironically, an extreme form of racism also exists in various Arab countries, where foreign workers find themselves placed in a demeaning hierarchy based on country of origin. Western European and Americans top the scale and are readily accommodated, while Southeast Asians are often at the bottom. A very qualified Indian engineer, for example, may find himself getting paid much less than a French engineer with relatively little experience.In some countries, like South Africa, racism has wrecked havoc on society for generations. It manifests itself in the refusal of some people to identify with their ancestral cultures because they fear that such affinity would negate the fact that they are “full” South African citizens (a right for which they fought a most arduous fight).In Malaysia, which exhibits considerable social harmony when compared to some of it neighbours, racial classification is still very real. Despite the government’s commendable efforts to accentuate the Malaysian national model while carefully underscoring the Malay, Chinese or Indian sub-groupings, members of these groups are wary of their statistical representation in Malaysian society. Some react by stressing their number in comparison to that of other groups, while others tirelessly underscore the types of discrimination they experience at the hands of those with the political and economic advantages.While racism is universally recognised, few individuals would admit to their own prejudices and racist tendencies.
Moreover, it would be self-deceiving to view racism as a purely Western phenomenon.
While the Western model of racism, influenced by 18th-century colonialism, is unique in many respects, group prejudices based on class, race and religion are shared almost equally by all nations.The racism of those with political, military and economic power is often violent and detrimental, but it is important to remember that the underdog can be just as racist.An Arab reader from London sent me an e-mail demanding that I explain myself for collaborating on various projects with some well-known Jewish authors. “You are either naïve or you are selling out,” she wrote.
It made no difference to her that these authors are anti-Zionist and have been, for many years, on the frontline of the struggle for Palestinian rights and justice. She simply couldn’t break away from a deeply ingrained racist belief that “Jews are not to be trusted”.Of course, this is not an Arab, but a global predisposition; prolonged conflicts and wars tend to validate and inflate already existing prejudices.Although the Israeli educational system has produced generations of students saturated with grossly misleading images of Arabs and Palestinians, the relationship between Arabs and Jews hasn’t always been negative.
For centuries, both groups lived in harmony; some of the best Arab poets of past times were Jews and some of the most luminous Jewish texts were written originally in Arabic.
Unfortunately, conflict and war have a way of undermining such facts; racism in Israel is so intense now that few dare use the term “Arab Jew”.
When it is not a matter of race, some people seem to slide easily into greater tribal memberships that divide the world into “us” and “them”, often using words of negation and utilising religion. The “non” prefix becomes very useful here - “non-Muslim”, “non-Jew”, “non-Christian”, and so on.
Such negations are never well-intended and always produce negative results. Less apprehensive terms such as “non-democratic” (a neocolonial equivalent to “uncivilised”, perhaps?) could be similarly loaded and dangerous and are often used to promote and justify war.
A true fight against racism and various other types of group prejudice require, first, accepting personal responsibility in shaping one’s own society, and this includes the racism that exists within. Martin Luther King, Jr. refused “to accept the view that mankind is so tragically bound to the starless midnight of racism and war that the bright daybreak of peace and brotherhood can never become a reality”.
We all must uncompromisingly reject such a view as well, if we truly wish for peace, harmony and equality to replace war, social discord and injustice.
* Published in the JORDAN TIMES on September 26, 2007.
The writer is a Palestinian-American author and editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is “The Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People’s Struggle” (Pluto Press, London).
Wednesday, September 5, 2007
IMAGINE YOUR SELF IN TWO DEFFERENT SITUATION
Imagine if you have the freedom of expression and opinion?
Imagine if you have the freedom to participate in the demonstrations?
Imagine if you have freedom of movement?
Imagine if you live in a country where elections are visiting?
Did you Sttersch for President?
Imagine if your country clean from corruption and bureaucratic and financial theft by officials?
Imagine if you could say to an official from where it obtained the money?
Imagine if your phone - observer? Or you personally - observer?
Imagine if you lived without racial discrimination?
Imagine what you like or want. its not pre-paid
I do not know that the dream became prevented in our Arab world..... where there are the most possessing dirtiest and worst political systems?
You are a person and you do not feel by your estimate or by your value or by the happiness or hope just because you live within the geographical map of the Middle East and called North Africa ..
I agree with you if I said that this region such unbearable hell, I agree with you as one of the worst areas of the world and the most backward, I agree you.... with any description , but to imagine a little if you live in a democratic country
imagine what would happen difference Feel very happy automatically will be considered yourself being productive player will power to do any Shi go to your happy not mesiralble .you will have a Group of Friends ,,,,,,you Read a book ,,,,,any book,,,, you will be a psychological comfort first and then find an encouragment for reading or playing or to make a jerny or you will set at your computer for hours to discover the world
If ... After that thought yourself and the way your life from two different angles and in different situations ..
Do you ever thought why? the reason for your present situation ..... It is the political environment and the socio-economic backward and totally radically?
And you thought of causing or reason? Although the Middle East and North Africa have significant sources of wealth .. They failed political regimes ruling and dirty and dictatorship and authoritarian and oppressive, and If you looking for or achieve for better life for you or/and for your children..... can create something ... Try to be part of change..... Established your own blog or web site if you are having a computer skills ..... known more about your rights and demand it .. Participate in the political process and educational, social and economic Try to help others try to uncover flaws and scandals officials ..Try to do what it can do ...what each of us can ....Not required from you or me to change all our situation .
you and I me a part of this done ... of this changing . and every one of us a part .
Remember well that change does not come suddenly and does not come alone,,, Nothing.... required patience, courage and boldness of us.............. remember that Not enough to sit down and say that the country is bad or our situation is bad , but needed to do, and we do not do that for us.... it is for our children
let us know a clear truth...,our immigration to europe or to canada our situation will not be changedbecuase we left our children ,, our families.. our friends.. our societies in the bad bad situation ... so what about all of those ?
so let us to be the candle that lights the way for others
Haditha Probe Limps to a Close
by Khody Akhavi
Last December, when the U.S. Marine Corps charged four infantrymen for the murder of 24 civilians in the Iraqi town of Haditha on Nov. 19, 2005, the counts represented the most serious case of alleged war crimes committed by Marines in Iraq or Afghanistan.
An official account of the incident, released Nov. 20, said that 15 civilian Iraqis had been killed by a roadside bomb and eight other "insurgents" were gunned down as they fought Iraqi army soldiers and Marines immediately following the blast.
But as new details emerged, an investigation was launched, and a more disturbing narrative developed: the 24 Iraqis had been the apparent victims of a vengeful massacre at the hands of Marines.
Iraqi witnesses said that, after a roadside bomb had killed fellow Marine Lance Cpl. Miguel Terrazas, the Marines went on a rampage, slaughtering civilians on the street and in their homes. The dead included men, women, and children as young as two years old. Death certificates of the 24 Iraqis indicate that they had all been killed by gunshots, contrary to the official account.
The events of Haditha – like the Abu Ghraib detainee-abuse scandal in 2004 – outraged the U.S. public, and military officials promised to punish the guilty. But more than one year later, the attempt to hold officers accountable for Abu Ghraib has limped to a close, and the prosecution of the Marines accused in the Haditha killings shows signs of crumbling.
Last week, Army Lt. Col. Steven L. Jordan, the only officer to face trial over the Abu Ghraib scandal, was convicted of disobeying an order and reprimanded by a military jury, a punishment that spares him any jail time. Jordan's punishment is lighter than that of Army Col. Thomas M. Pappas, the top officer at Abu Ghraib. He confessed to approving the use of dogs in interrogations and was granted immunity from prosecution.
The preliminary hearing for Marine Staff Sgt. Frank D. Wuterich began Thursday at Camp Pendleton in California and marks perhaps the last chance for prosecutors to bring to court-martial any of the Marines charged with being directly responsible for the Haditha killings. Wuterich, the Marine squad leader and the senior enlisted man in the incident, is charged with 13 counts of murder in connection with the deaths of 18 Iraqis.
Of the four enlisted Marines and four officers charged, murder charges against two of the enlisted men have since been dropped, as have dereliction of duty charges against one of the officers, Capt. Randy W. Stone, a lawyer with the battalion.
As in the Abu Ghraib scandal, the prosecutions in Haditha tend to focus on enlisted men and noncommissioned officers – those accused of having personally committed the acts – not the officers who command the units. In the Abu Ghraib case, 11 soldiers were convicted of various charges relating to the incidents, including dereliction of duty.
The four commissioned officers involved with the Haditha killings were only charged with failing to direct a thorough investigation and were not present during the incident.
But prosecutors have had a difficult time convincing a skeptical investigating officer and a general who presides over preliminary hearings that the Marines had committed murder in Haditha. Additionally, the killings were not thoroughly investigated when they first occurred, and forensic evidence is nonexistent.
In August, Lt. Col. Paul J. Ware recommended that charges against Lance Cpl. Justin L. Sharratt and Lance Cpl. Stephen B. Tatum be dismissed, arguing that in both cases, the Marines were operating in a complex combat environment and that their actions, while horrific, did not constitute a criminal offense.
"My opinion is that there is insufficient evidence for trial. Lt. Cpl. Tatum shot and killed people in houses 1 and 2, but the reason he did so was because of his training and the circumstances he was placed in, not to exact revenge and commit murder," wrote Ware in a 29-page report regarding Tatum's conduct.
Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, commanding officer of Marine Forces Central Command, dismissed charges against Sharratt after a preliminary hearing, and in a letter to the infantryman, wrote:
"The intense examination into this incident, and into your conduct, has been necessary to maintain our discipline standards, and, in the words of the Marine hymn, 'To keep our honor clean.' … You have served as a Marine infantryman in Iraq where our nation is fighting a shadowy enemy who hides among the innocent people, and routinely targets and intentionally draws fire toward civilians."
Charges against another member of the squad, Sgt. Sanick Dela Cruz, were dropped in exchange for his testimony against other Marines. On Friday, Cruz testified that he saw Wuterich kill five Iraqis as they stood beside a taxi immediately after the blast. He said Wuterich then walked over to the bodies and pumped more bullets into them, according to a report from the Los Angeles Times.
"He went to each and shot at them," Dela Cruz said. "The muzzle [of his rifle] was about a foot from their upper torsos."
Several hours after the incident, Wuterich reportedly told Cruz that should officers question him, the five Iraqis had been running away. Under the rules of engagement taught to Marines, Iraqis fleeing the scene of a roadside bomb explosion can be shot in the back, according to testimony at a preliminary hearing for another Marine.
In some cases, soldiers have faced much stiffer penalties.
Seven Marines and a Navy corpsman were charged with kidnapping and killing an Iraqi in the town of Hamandiya in April 2006. Five of the eight squad members pleaded guilty and the three others were convicted at courts-martial. Only the squad leader, Sgt. Lawrence Hutchins, is still behind bars, but his 15-year sentence is being reviewed by Mattis, commanding officer of Marine Forces Central Command.
Three soldiers accused of the rape and murder of a teenage girl and her family in March 2006 in Mahmudiyah received life sentences after pleading guilty. A fourth soldier who acted as a lookout was sentenced to 27 months in jail. The accused ringleader, Steven Green, risks the death penalty.
Last December, when the U.S. Marine Corps charged four infantrymen for the murder of 24 civilians in the Iraqi town of Haditha on Nov. 19, 2005, the counts represented the most serious case of alleged war crimes committed by Marines in Iraq or Afghanistan.
An official account of the incident, released Nov. 20, said that 15 civilian Iraqis had been killed by a roadside bomb and eight other "insurgents" were gunned down as they fought Iraqi army soldiers and Marines immediately following the blast.
But as new details emerged, an investigation was launched, and a more disturbing narrative developed: the 24 Iraqis had been the apparent victims of a vengeful massacre at the hands of Marines.
Iraqi witnesses said that, after a roadside bomb had killed fellow Marine Lance Cpl. Miguel Terrazas, the Marines went on a rampage, slaughtering civilians on the street and in their homes. The dead included men, women, and children as young as two years old. Death certificates of the 24 Iraqis indicate that they had all been killed by gunshots, contrary to the official account.
The events of Haditha – like the Abu Ghraib detainee-abuse scandal in 2004 – outraged the U.S. public, and military officials promised to punish the guilty. But more than one year later, the attempt to hold officers accountable for Abu Ghraib has limped to a close, and the prosecution of the Marines accused in the Haditha killings shows signs of crumbling.
Last week, Army Lt. Col. Steven L. Jordan, the only officer to face trial over the Abu Ghraib scandal, was convicted of disobeying an order and reprimanded by a military jury, a punishment that spares him any jail time. Jordan's punishment is lighter than that of Army Col. Thomas M. Pappas, the top officer at Abu Ghraib. He confessed to approving the use of dogs in interrogations and was granted immunity from prosecution.
The preliminary hearing for Marine Staff Sgt. Frank D. Wuterich began Thursday at Camp Pendleton in California and marks perhaps the last chance for prosecutors to bring to court-martial any of the Marines charged with being directly responsible for the Haditha killings. Wuterich, the Marine squad leader and the senior enlisted man in the incident, is charged with 13 counts of murder in connection with the deaths of 18 Iraqis.
Of the four enlisted Marines and four officers charged, murder charges against two of the enlisted men have since been dropped, as have dereliction of duty charges against one of the officers, Capt. Randy W. Stone, a lawyer with the battalion.
As in the Abu Ghraib scandal, the prosecutions in Haditha tend to focus on enlisted men and noncommissioned officers – those accused of having personally committed the acts – not the officers who command the units. In the Abu Ghraib case, 11 soldiers were convicted of various charges relating to the incidents, including dereliction of duty.
The four commissioned officers involved with the Haditha killings were only charged with failing to direct a thorough investigation and were not present during the incident.
But prosecutors have had a difficult time convincing a skeptical investigating officer and a general who presides over preliminary hearings that the Marines had committed murder in Haditha. Additionally, the killings were not thoroughly investigated when they first occurred, and forensic evidence is nonexistent.
In August, Lt. Col. Paul J. Ware recommended that charges against Lance Cpl. Justin L. Sharratt and Lance Cpl. Stephen B. Tatum be dismissed, arguing that in both cases, the Marines were operating in a complex combat environment and that their actions, while horrific, did not constitute a criminal offense.
"My opinion is that there is insufficient evidence for trial. Lt. Cpl. Tatum shot and killed people in houses 1 and 2, but the reason he did so was because of his training and the circumstances he was placed in, not to exact revenge and commit murder," wrote Ware in a 29-page report regarding Tatum's conduct.
Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, commanding officer of Marine Forces Central Command, dismissed charges against Sharratt after a preliminary hearing, and in a letter to the infantryman, wrote:
"The intense examination into this incident, and into your conduct, has been necessary to maintain our discipline standards, and, in the words of the Marine hymn, 'To keep our honor clean.' … You have served as a Marine infantryman in Iraq where our nation is fighting a shadowy enemy who hides among the innocent people, and routinely targets and intentionally draws fire toward civilians."
Charges against another member of the squad, Sgt. Sanick Dela Cruz, were dropped in exchange for his testimony against other Marines. On Friday, Cruz testified that he saw Wuterich kill five Iraqis as they stood beside a taxi immediately after the blast. He said Wuterich then walked over to the bodies and pumped more bullets into them, according to a report from the Los Angeles Times.
"He went to each and shot at them," Dela Cruz said. "The muzzle [of his rifle] was about a foot from their upper torsos."
Several hours after the incident, Wuterich reportedly told Cruz that should officers question him, the five Iraqis had been running away. Under the rules of engagement taught to Marines, Iraqis fleeing the scene of a roadside bomb explosion can be shot in the back, according to testimony at a preliminary hearing for another Marine.
In some cases, soldiers have faced much stiffer penalties.
Seven Marines and a Navy corpsman were charged with kidnapping and killing an Iraqi in the town of Hamandiya in April 2006. Five of the eight squad members pleaded guilty and the three others were convicted at courts-martial. Only the squad leader, Sgt. Lawrence Hutchins, is still behind bars, but his 15-year sentence is being reviewed by Mattis, commanding officer of Marine Forces Central Command.
Three soldiers accused of the rape and murder of a teenage girl and her family in March 2006 in Mahmudiyah received life sentences after pleading guilty. A fourth soldier who acted as a lookout was sentenced to 27 months in jail. The accused ringleader, Steven Green, risks the death penalty.
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